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On January 20, 1989, the transition in presidential administrations
moved the country into a new political era. The Bush Administration, like
the preceding administrations, will regulate energy production, distribution,
and consumption. Continued energy regulation is a fact of modem economic
life. The new president may be surprised to find that our domestic energy
policy falls within a relatively narrow perimeter which even he is powerless
to enlarge dramatically. For better or worse, the normal boundary of
national energy policy is well established by a century of experience.'
Although predicting the future is a fool's game and predicting future
government regulation is even more foolish during a change in presidential
administrations, certain directions in energy regulation can be seen. This
Article will address those directions. Broadly speaking, federal regulation is
moving toward greater reliance on market ordering in the areas of natural
gas and electricity through administrative rulemaking rather than through
congressional enactments. At the same time, federal regulation is being
supplanted in part by more cautious state regulation. However, federal and
state regulations are fueled by different goals. The goal of allocative
(economic) efficiency motivates federal efforts. The goal of distributional
equity guides state regulation. In both cases, federal and state efforts are
consistent with mainstream energy policy.
This Article will proceed as follows. Part I will present the dominant
model of energy regulation by contrasting the energy policies of Presidents
Carter and Reagan and by showing why each failed to achieve their more
ambitious objectives. Part II will explain federal natural gas and electricity
regulations now being considered by the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission (FERC). Part III will examine state natural gas and electricity
regulations. Because federal and state regulations often conflict, the United
States Supreme Court frequently must resolve the resulting federalism prob-
lems. Part IV discusses recent energy decisions of the Supreme Court. The
Article concludes by suggesting a dozen future energy initiatives that are
generated by and are consistent with the traditional model of national energy
policy.
* Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law.
1. See J. CLARx, ENERGY AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: FossIL FUEL POLICIES, 1900-
1946 (1987); D. VIETOR, ENERGY POLICY IN AMERICA SINCE 1945: A STuDy OF BusnMEss-
GOVERNMENT RELATIONS (1984).
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II. THE U.S. ENERGY POLICY MODEL
The benchmark for contemporary energy regulation is the Arab Oil
Embargo of October 1973, which forced citizens to wait for hours in line
to buy gasoline rationed by license plate number. There were earlier indi-
cators of a troubled energy economy in the late 1960s as domestic oil
production peaked2 and inflation continued to grow. In response, President
Nixon began to realign energy agencies slightly by creating the Federal
Energy Office3 to coordinate oil price regulations and gather energy infor-
mation to bolster a sagging economy. Still, it was the OPEC oil embargo
that provoked energy policymakers to act as the country experienced a
tightening of its energy supplies, particularly oil, the lifeblood of commerce,
transportation, and national defense. Later, the Federal Energy Office
became the Federal Energy Agency, 4 and ultimately, in 1977, became the
Department of Energy (DOE) during the Carter Administration. 5
Carter's attempts to centralize energy decisionmaking and policymaking
and to coordinate energy planning were followed by Reagan's attempts to
deregulate energy industries. The Carter and Reagan administrations' efforts
to centralize and to deregulate energy industries, respectively, were unsuc-
cessful. Neither administration was effective in radically altering energy
regulation. Rather, energy regulation hewed closely to a model policy that
has developed over the last century. The inability of these two presidential
administrations to control energy policy should be instructive to a new
administration and its energy policymakers. Also, the discussion of energy
regulation during the Carter and Reagan administrations serves as a prelude
to an examination of recent energy developments and current regulatory
proposals which will confront the new president.
A. Centralization and President Carter
The Carter Administration was enveloped by a cascade of energy
regulations. During his four years in office, Carter delivered several major
energy addresses, each of which resulted in significant legislation. The
creation of the DOE, together with sweeping energy policies directed at
both conventional fuels and renewable resources, was the most significant
attempt at national and comprehensive energy planning in the country's
history. At their most ambitious, these legislative packages were an attempt
2. See, e.g., Bupp & Schuller, Natural Gas: How to Slice a Shrinking Pie, in ENERGY
FuTuRn 56-78 (R. Stobaugh & D. Yergin eds. 1979) (noting that State Department was aware
of domestic peak in oil production in 1968 and peak occurs in 1970); DEARTMENT OF ENERoY,
ANNUAL ENERoY RnvInw 1986 DOE/EIA-0384(86) 2 (1987) (domestic oil production peaked
in 1970 at 20.40 quadrillion BTUs or 3,468 million barrels of oil).
3. See J. KALT, THE EcONOMICS AND PoLMncs oF Oin PiucE REGULATION: FEDERAL
PoLicy IN THE Posr-EmBARmo ERA 1-31 (1981).
4. Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-275, 88 Stat. 115 (1974).
5. Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (codified
primarily at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7375 (1982)).
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to move the country's energy policies from the 19th century into the 21st
century.
There were four significant energy events during the Carter Adminis-
tration. First, Carter centralized energy administration in the cabinet level
Department of Energy. Unfortunately, from the standpoint of coordination,
the DOE did not have adequate power to design a comprehensive national
energy plan. Energy decisionmaking and policymaking responsibilities were
scattered over several branches of the federal government, and authority
was fragmented even within the DOE.
6
The second energy event of the Carter Administration was President
Carter's "moral equivalent of war" speech on April 18, 1977. 7 This speech
outlined the substantive principles of President Carter's energy policy.
Although the principles were not free from conflicts and difficulties, 8 the
speech led to the passage of the National Energy Act in October 1978. 9 The
National Energy Act addressed conventional fuels and tried to move the
country away from a dependence on foreign oil. Among other goals, the
National Energy Act intended to promote the use of coal; increase energy
efficiency; modernize utility ratemaking; stimulate conservation; encourage
the creation of a new electricity market; and restructure a distorted natural
gas market.
The third major energy event was President Carter's energy address on
April 5, 1979.10 This address stressed the need for decontrol of oil prices
to increase domestic oil production. The address led to Congress' passage
of the Crude Oil Windfall Profits Tax." Congress designed the Windfall
Profits Tax to capture some of the economic rents domestic oil producers
realized as a result of the rise in world oil prices.
The Carter Administration's final major energy event was President
Carter's energy address on July 15 and 16, 1979,12 in which he returned to
his moral equivalent of war rhetoric. Again, Congress answered the speech
by passing the Energy Security Act of 1980.13 The Energy Security Act was
6. See Tomain, Institutionalized Conflicts Between Law and Policy, 22 Hous. L. REv.
661 (1985); see also Aman, Institutionalizing the Energy Crisis: Some Structural and Procedural
Lessons, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 491 (1980); Byse, The Department of Energy Organization Act:
Structure and Procedure, 30 AnamN. L. REv. 193 (1978).
7. J. CraRnE, PUBLIC PAPERS OF TBE PRESIDENTS 656-62 (1977).
8. Tomain, supra note 6, at 672-76.
9. The National Energy Act consists of five pieces of major legislation: the National
Energy Conservation Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4335 (1982); the Powerplant and Industrial
Fuel Use Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8484 (1982); the Natural Gas Policy Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-
3342 (1982); the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117
(1982); and the Energy Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174 (1982).
10. J. CARTER, supra note 7, at 609-14 (1979).
11. Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229 (codified in various sections of 17, 19, 26, 31, and
42 U.S.C.).
12. J. CARTER, supra note 7, at 1235-47 (1979).
13. The Energy Security Act also consists of several pieces of legislation including: the
Defense Production Act Amendments of 1980, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2061-2166 (1982); the United
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a dramatically conceived package of legislation that turned energy policy
away from conventional resources and toward the development and pro-
motion of synthetic fuels, such as oil and natural gas, from coal, oil shale,
and tar sands. The Energy Security Act also attempted to stimulate a third
energy transition 4 from fossil fuels to renewable resources such as solar
energy, biomass, alcohol, and geothermal steam and made conservation a
larger part of the country's energy planning.
The legislation that emerged during the Carter Administration did not
achieve the goal of coordinating national energy policy. Nor did the legis-
lation stimulate the so-called third energy transition from fossil fuels to
renewable resources and conservation. Superficially, this failure to coordi-
nate a national energy policy may be explained by the fact that President
Carter had only one term in office. Also superficially, the failure to achieve
or even move noticeably toward transition might be explained by inadequate
federal research and development. The reasons for the failure, however,
run deeper. Simply, Carter's energy program conflicted with the country's
entrenched model of energy policy. The attempted coordination failed
because the model resists centralization and the transition failed because the
model relies on the market for the signal to move into other resources.
B. President Reagan and Deregulation
If President Carter's highly centralized, progovernment energy policy
failed, then President Reagan's private sector, supply-side, antigovernment
deregulation efforts should have succeeded, and the DOE should have been
dismantled. This scenario did not come to pass, although President Reagan
has undone some of Carter's energy policies through greater federal reliance
on the market and less reliance on centralized planning. Indeed, President
Reagan made his energy intentions clear on January 28, 1981,11 when, as
one of his first acts in office, he decontrolled oil prices. The oil price
decontrol was largely symbolic, however, because the price controls were
scheduled to terminate on October 1, 1981.
Reagan did not, however, cut his deregulation program from whole
cloth. Natural gas deregulation, like oil deregulation, was scheduled to occur
as per the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA).16 Similarly, although
States Synthetic Fuels Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8701-95 (1982); the Biomass and Alcohol
Fuels Act, 42 U.S.C. § 8803 et seq. (1982); the Renewable Energy Resources Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 2701-08 and 42 U.S.C. 7371-75 (1982); the Solar Energy and Energy Conservation Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 6862-72; 8211-21; and 8281-86(b) (1982); the Geothermal Energy Act, 30 U.S.C. §§
1101-64 (1982); and the Acid Precipitation Act, 42 U.S.C, §§ 8901-12 (1982).
14. The first transition, from wood to coal, occurred in the middle of the 19th century,
and the second transition from coal to oil and natural gas started at the beginning of this
century and was completed by the end of World War II. See generally Bupp & Schuller,
Natural Gas. How to Slice a Shrinking Pie, in ENERGY IN THE AMERICAN EcoNoMY, 1850-
1975; AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF rrs HISTORY AND PROsPEcTs 45-143 (S. Schurr & B. Netschert
eds. 1960).
15. Exec. Order No. 12,287, 3 C.F.R. §§ 124-25 (1981).
16. Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3352 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3342 (1982)).
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President Reagan campaigned to dismantle the United States Synthetic Fuels
Corporation, the synfuels program failed because the market was unable to
support it. Synfuels producers were not able to process coal into natural
gas or to reap oil from tar sands or oil shale at a cost competitive with oil
and natural gas on the market.' 7 Although coal conversion legislation, the
Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978,18 was largely repealed' 9
during the Reagan Administration, the administration cannot be credited
with a major deregulatory victory. Coal conversion legislation dating back
to President Nixon has been judged to be ineffective.
20
Perhaps the Reagan Administration's most significant energy legislation
was the ill-titled Electric Consumer Protection Act of 1986 (ECPA).21 The
ECPA amends Part I of the Federal Power Act,2 which licenses federal
hydroelectric power projects. The amendments are intended to price hydro-
power at a competitive market price rather than at a price based on the
federal government's embedded costs in constructing and operating the
dams, and by eliminating "preferences" (price discounts) to municipalities.
Presently under the EPCA, municipalities must compete with private utilities
in purchasing federal hydropower.?
President Reagan, like every other president since Lyndon Johnson,
campaigned against big government. Reagan's campaign differed, however,
by singling out the DOE among other agencies,2 for abolition. The DOE
was to be abolished as part of Reagan's supply-side economic deregulation
program. Obviously, Reagan was unsuccessful, because the DOE continues
its bureaucratic life. The DOE's continued existence and Reagan's failure
to deregulate energy in substantial ways may be explained by the general
intransigence of bureaucracies. This explanation, however, is too pat, too
superficial. Like the explanation for Carter's failure to centralize national
energy planning, a more refined explanation can be found in the dominant
model of energy regulation. The model shows that government regulation
17. See, e.g., U.S. GEN'L AccT. OFMCE, SYNraaic FUELs, STATUS OF THE GREAT PLAINs
COAL GAsIFCATION PROJECT GAO/RCED-88-53FS (November 1987) (synfuels project not
financially feasible).
18. Pub. L. No. 95-620, 95 Stat. 3291 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8484 (1982)).
19. Pub. L. No. 100-42, 101 Stat. 310 (1987).
20. According to a DOE report, for example, between January 1, 1983 and December
31, 1985, the DOE granted all requests for exemptions to the Fuel Use Act. See Natural Gas
Legislation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy Regulation and Conservation of the
Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 208-221 (April 15,
1986); Robertson, The Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978: Fuel Replacement, 3
HARV. ENVT'L L. REv. 214 (1979).
21. Pub. L. No. 99-495, 100 Stat. 1243 (1986). 1 say that the act is poorly titled because
it will raise prices for municipal consumers without necessarily reducing prices for consumers
of investor-owned utilities, thus protecting no consumers.
22. 16 U.S.C. §§ 792-828(c) (1982).
23. See generally Bornong, The Electric Consumer Protection Act of 1986: Changes in
Hydro Licensing?, 23 GONZ. L. Rtv. 135 (1987-88).
24. The Department of Education and the United States Synthetic Fuels Corporation
were also earmarked for extinction.
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of energy is well embedded in the country's political economy. Reagan's
deregulation violated that model by relying too much on the market and
too little on government support of conventional fuels and producers.
C. The Rough Equilibrium of Energy Policy
The energy policies of the Carter and Reagan administrations represent
extremes that could not last much beyond their immediate causes. President
Carter's centralization policy was a continuation of the Nixon and Ford
administrations' responses to the Arab Oil Embargo, to the embargo's
negative economic effects on our domestic economy, and to the threat the
embargo posed to national security. Consequently, as the OPEC threat
receded and as the country responded to market dislocations caused by the
1973 and 1979 embargos, extraordinary government oil controls were un-
necessary. Once consumers adjusted to the price of gasoline at the pump
and oil producers received accurate price signals, oil price controls lost their
immediacy and their continuation adversely affected the economy.Y Simi-
larly, once artificial regulatory constraints were removed from natural gas
markets, prices lowered and supplies increased, more closely reflecting
market allocations. 2
6
The genesis of Reagan's energy policies differed from Carter's. Where
Carter's policies were stimulated by the exogenous events of the global oil
market, Reagan's prescriptions were the endogenous manifestations of his
ideologically motivated supply-side economics. Yet, Reagan's policies did
not result in the complete deregulation of energy. While oil has undergone
successful price and allocation deregulation and most natural gas prices
have been deregulated, OPEC's power to control supplies has diminished,
with a consequent fall in prices and a rise in the call for oil import quotas. 27
In addition, the key transportation segments of the natural gas and electricity
industries continue to possess market power,n thus making deregulation
unlikely and undesireable. 29
The Carter and Reagan policies were similar in that both were incon-
sistent with the dominant energy policy model and with the prevailing
25. See J. KALT, supra note 3, at 285-95. See generally, D. GLASNER, POLITICS, PUCES,
AND PETROLEuM: Tim PoIT.mCAL ECONOMY OF ENERGY (1985).
26. See S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFOR ch. 13 (1982); M.E. SANDERS, TEm
REGULATION OF NATURAL GAS: POLICY AND POLITcs, 1938-78 ch. 7 (1981); A. TussiNG & C.
BARuow, Tim NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY : EVOLUTION, STRUCTURE, AND EcONOcs ch.9 (1984).
27. See W. HOGAN & B. MOSSAVAR-RAHMNAm, ENERGY SECURITY REvIsrrED (1987);
National Oil Security Policy, Hearing before Subcomm. on Energy Regulation and Conservation
of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (June 2, 1987).
28. See infra note 38 (defining market power).
29. See, e.g., Broadman, Deregulating Entry and Access to Pipelines, in DRAWING THE
LINE ON NATURAL GAS REGULATION 125 (J. Kalt & F. Schuller eds. 1987) (natural gas pipelines
have market power); P. JosKow & R. SCHmALANSEE, MARKETS FOR PowER: AN ANALYSIS OF
ELECTRIC UTIrrY DEREGULATION (1983) (market power exhibited in transmission sector of
electricity industry).
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market. The dominant model requires the government to support conven-
tional resources while recognizing that some segments of energy industries
possess enough market power to require regulation. In the prevailing market,
OPEC is not able to hold the supply line in oil, the NGPA opened up
natural gas supplies, and the price elasticity of demand for electricity is
more elastic than analysts previously thought. Therefore, oil, natural gas,
and electricity supplies are more abundant than many dire prophets in the
mid-1970s predicted. This energy abundance can be traced to market forces
that government oversight has stabilized. The abundance was no more a
product of Reagan's deregulation politics than it was a result of Carter's
central planning. Rather, stable energy production, distribution, and con-
sumption are consequences of the interplay of government and industry
within relatively narrow limits of a mixed-market political economy.30
Without overstating the case, the country has an industrial policy of
sorts regarding energy 'production, distribution, and consumption. The key
to understanding the political economy of energy is to recognize the tight
interrelationship between government and industry.3' This symbiotic rela-
tionship between government and industry is manifest by four characteristics.
First, energy resources are interconnected so that the regulation of one
affects the supply or demand of another. Oil and electricity, for example,
divide the energy pie into two approximately equal halves that do not greatly
overlap. Electricity does not occupy much of the transporation sector and
oil is not the most economic resource to burn to produce electricity.
Therefore, federal energy policy can support both oil and electricity pro-
duction. A second characteristic of the government-industry relationship is
that energy resources are susceptible to interfuel competition. A federal
policy that promotes the use of coal to generate electricity simultaneously
discourages the use of nuclear power for the same purpose. A third
characteristic is that industry and government depend on each other for the
distribution and allocation of benefits and burdens. The federal government,
for example, controls most of the new oil reserves but depends on private
industry for their development. Likewise, the oil industry, despite its fre-
quent laissez-faire posturing, is not above asking for the helping hand of
government in the form of oil import quotas. A final characteristic of the
relationship between government and industry is that both business and
government are stimulated by market disequilibria. The embargo prompted
the government's oil price controls. The loosening of federally established
prices resulted in business' increased exploration for natural gas. This
interplay between government and industry has produced a dominant model
of domestic energy policy.
Domestic energy policy favors large-scale, high technology, capital in-
tensive, integrated, centralized firms for the production and distribution of
30. See generally C. LINDBLOM, PoLITics AND MNRKETs: TH WoRLD's PoLmcAL-Eco-
NOMIC SYsTEMs (1977).
31. See D. ViEroR, supra note 1, at 1-12.
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energyY2 The policy favors these archetype energy firms over alternatives,
such as small solar or wind firms, because energy policymakers believe that
the larger firms can continue to realize economies of scale. Policymakers
gamble that the archetype firms, rather than alternative firms, can achieve
greater energy efficiencies through technological innovation, discovery of
new reserves, or discovery of new energy sources. This belief may or may
not be true. Nevertheless, the belief persists and the favoritism will continue
as alternative firms carry the burden of persuading policymakers otherwise.
Put another way, as long as energy production, consumption, and prices
remain stable, the embedded policy will continue.
A federal energy policy favoring traditional forms of energy production
over alternative sources and new technologies is based on the assumption
that there is a positive correlation between energy use and economic growth
33
(the energy-GNP link).34 While the correlation is not a one-to-one correla-
tion,35 economic productivity tends to increase with an increase in energy
production. The resulting energy policy has the following general goals:
(1) to assure abundant supplies; 36
(2) to maintain reasonable prices;37
(3) to limit the market power of archetype firms; 38
32. For a discussion of the role of fossil fuels in domestic enery production and
consumption, see infra note 40. For a discussion of the type of energy producers favored, see
A. LoviNs, SoFr ENERGY PATHS: TOWARD A DutrAL PEAcE 1-31 (1977).
33. See, e.g., Berndt & Wood, Energy Price Shocks and Productivity Growth: A Survey,
in ENERGY: MARKETS AND REGULATION-ESSAYS IN HONOR OF M. A. ADELMAN 305-42 (R.
Gordon, H. Jacoby & M. Zimmerman eds. 1987); NATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGIES PROJECT,
ENERGY IN AMERICA'S FUTuRE: THE CHOICES BEFORE Us ch. 3 (1979); see also G. BNEY,
THE GLOBAL 2000 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S. (1980); J. SimoN & H. KArH, THE
REsoTURcEFUL EARTHr (1984). But see A. LoviNs, supra note 32, at 7-11.
34. Please note that the statement that there is an energy-GNP link is not meant to
encompass the further inference that greater economic productivity and more energy production
necessarily means an improvement in general welfare. Bigger may be better, however, that is
a normative claim that I am not prepared to make, let alone defend. The energy-GNP link is
intended as a positive not a normative assertion.
35. Yergin, Conservation: The Key Energy Source, in ENERGY FUTURE 141-42 (R.
Stobaugh & D. Yergin eds. 1979).
36. Today, a healthy availability of energy resources means that the lights go on when
the switch is flipped; the car starts when the key is turned; and the air conditioning works.
See id. at 144-48.
37. A corollary of the energy-GNP link is stability in energy prices. As long as the real
price of energy is stable, then productivity is stable because a larger portion of income is not
expended on energy. With the exception of the decade between 1973 and 1983, approximately,
energy prices generally have been stable since the beginning of the century. See U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, HisroucAL STATISTICS OF THE UNIrED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1957 (1960)
(see series G 244-330 and 353-426); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNtED STATES 1984 (1983) (Table 985); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 1987 (1986) (Table 941); ENERGY INFORMATION AGENCY, ANNUAL ENERGY
REviaw 1987 DOE/EIA-0384(87) (May 1988) (Table 22).
38. "Market power" can be variously defined: "[Tihe ability of a firm (or a group of
firms, acting jointly) to raise price above the competitive level without losing so many sales
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(4) to promote inter- and intrafuel competition; 9
(5) to support a limited number of conventional fuels (oil, natural
gas, coal, hydropower, and nuclear power);40 and
(6) to allow energy decisionmaking and policymaking to develop
within an active federal-state regulatory system.
4'
This loose policy can be contrasted with a comprehensive national
energy plan. Although Congress requires the president to submit a biennial
national energy plan, which the DOE submits,42 the country has never had
a single end-state energy plan with articulated and coordinated goals and
objectives. Instead, the country has always had a series of policies pertaining
to individual industries. 43 Combined, these separate policies share the six
goals mentioned above and together they are consistent with the traditional
and prevailing market-oriented pluralism, or the democratic capitalism, of
our political economy.
so rapidly that the price increase is unprofitable and must be rescinded." Landes & Posner,
Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HAv. L. REv. 937 (1981); see also United States v. E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956) ("Monopoly power is the power to
control prices or exclude competition."); W. BA.DwJN, MARKET PowER, COMPETITION, A
ANTITRUST POuCY 3 (1987) ("[T]he abilities of firms to influence the prices of their products
either through independent actions or through actions coordinated with others"); Comments,
Landes and Posner on Market Power: Four Responses, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1787-1874 (1982).
Today, market power is threatened by natural gas pipelines and electric transmission
facilities. See Pierce, A Proposal to Deregulate the Market for Bulk Power, 72 VA. L. REv.
1183 (1986) (electricity transmission retains market power); Pierce, Reconstituting the Natural
Gas Industry from Wellhead to Burnertip, 9 ENERGY L. J. 1, 16-18 (1988) (natural gas
transmission retains market power); see also supra note 29 (noting additional sources on
subject of market power).
39. See generally J. CLA~u, supra note 1; D. VmToR, supra note 1.
40. Most of the fuels produced and consumed domestically consist of fossil fuels like
coal, natural gas, and oil. Fossil fuels are either consumed or used in the production of
electricity. Nuclear power and hydropower supplement fossil fuels in the production of
electricity and "alternative fuels," such as solar, wind, geothermal, or even synthetic fuels
such as oil shale, do not play a major role in the country's energy picture as the following
figures demonstrate.
The United States consumed 76 quads (one quad equals one quadrillion BTUs of energy)
of energy in 1987. The 76 quads are divided among the following resources: coal (18.00);
natural gas (17.18); oil (32.63); hydropower (3.04); nuclear power (4.92); geothermal (0.23);
and other (wood, waste, wind, photovoltaic, and solar connected to electric utilities-these
sources which produce energy for direct consumption are not included) (0.02). ENERGY
INFORMATION AGENCY, ANNUAL ENERGY REvmw 1987 DOE/EIA-0384(87) (1988) (Table 3 at
p. 11). Production figures are similar, although somewhat lower, indicating that the country
is a net importer of energy. In 1987, the country produced 64.55 quads of energy divided
among the following resources: coal (20.12); natural gas (16.84); oil (17.59); natural gas liquids
(2.23); hydropower (2.61); nuclear power (4.92) geothermal (0.23); and other (0.02). Id. (Table
2 at p. 9).
41. See infra part IV (discussing Supreme Court and energy federalism).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 7321 (1982).
43. See generally J. CaBB, INTEREST GROUPS AND THE BUREAUCRACY: THE PoLITcs OF
ENERGY chs. 1, 7 (1983); B. COMMONER, THE PoLrTCs oF ENERGY (1979); D. DAVIS, ENERGY
POLITCS (3d ed. 1982); FORD FOUNDATION, A TIME To CHOOSE (1974); W. ROSENBAUM, ENERGY,
POLITICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1981); Tomain, supra note 6.
1989]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:63
The baseline for this federal energy policy is the market. Federal energy
regulation aspires to attain the benefits of a competitive market, including
wealth maximization, efficient and fair allocation and distribution of re-
sources, and technological innovation while promoting individual liberty
and equality. 44 It should come as no suprise that energy industries do not
operate in such a rarified market. Instead, government regulation is neces-
sary to reduce market imperfections and approach a state of workable
competition. 45 Starting from the market baseline, energy policymakers (state
and federal) mimic the market as they resist interfuel coordination and
planning in favor of interfuel and intrafuel competition among a limited
number of conventional resources. The embedded hard energy path favors
conventional fuels such as oil, coal, natural gas, hydropower, electricity,
and nuclear power, while deemphasizing both conventional and unconven-
tional alternative energy sources. 46 Simply, it is unrealistic to assume that a
radically different energy policy will emerge from this entrenched system.
Thus, neither President Carter's attempt to coordinate and formulate a
comprehensive and centralized national energy plan nor President Reagan's
attempt to deregulate energy on a broad scale was likely to stray far from
the model. Nor is it likely that federal energy policy will be transformed
greatly during the Bush Administration.
The existence of a dominant energy policy does not preclude new
regulatory initiatives. Indeed, it is precisely because of interactions between
government and industry, between federal and state governments, and
between markets and politics that energy regulation is a continuous process.
The policy that emerges from these interactions tilts sometimes in favor of
government and sometimes in favor of the market. Nevertheless, government
and industry participation in energy policymaking stays in rough equilibrium.
Currently, there are several, sometimes dramatic, energy regulations at both
the state and federal levels that will influence the future development of
energy policy. This Article will examine these regulations to see how closely
they adhere to the dominant model.
III. FEDERAL REGULATION AND TBE MARKET
Since the beginning of the 1980s, energy markets have moved toward
equilibrium, reducing the need for radical executive and congressional
intervention. Nevertheless, energy regulation does not stand still. Instead,
administrative agencies and courts regulate on a daily basis, away from the
44. See, e.g., F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTrEs AND ECONOMIC PERFORM-
ANCE ch. I (2d ed. 1980). The description in the text is a slight caricature of the good life in
the market.
45. See, e.g., Bailey & Baumol, Deregulation and the Theory of Contestable Markets, 1
YALE J. oN REG. 111 (1984).
46. "Alternative energy sources" can be divided into conventional substitutes and renew-
able resources. Conventional substitutes would include such resources as oil shale, tar sands,
and coal gas, which are intended to supplement and substitute for oil and natural gas.
Renewable resources would include solar, wind, and biomass.
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more political branches. Contemporary federal energy regulation, particu-
larly of the natural gas and electric industries, is occurring most noticeably
at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The simple theme
for FERC regulation is competition. From FERC's energy policy perspective,
relative abundance and low prices indicate increasing competition in the
natural gas and electricity markets. FERC is trying to move the pricing and
allocation decisions of both industries away from administrative law judges
and toward market-based mechanisms.
A. FERC Natural Gas Initiatives
Recent FERC natural gas regulation has been called nothing less than
revolutionary. 47 Through a series of rulemaking orders as interpreted by the
influential United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, the natural
gas industry is facing its most significant restructuring since the Natural
Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA).4 Indeed, these FERC orders rank in
historical importance with the passage of the Natural Gas Act in 1938, 4 9
the 1954 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin0 decision, and, of course,
the NGPA. If implemented successfully, FERC's rulemaking orders will
constitute an unprecedented restructuring of an industry by an administrative
agency without a new legislative mandate.
The revolution in natural gas regulation was provoked by a market
dislocation. In the mid-1970s, the regulations which created dual (federal
and state) natural gas markets , 1 and price rises attributable to the oil
embargos, caused shortages which resulted in two regulatory events. First,
Congress passed the NGPA, which had the avowed purpose of stimulating
production while cushioning consumers from gross price shocks. 52 The
NGPA was to accomplish this objective by unifying federal and state markets
and through phased deregulation of wellhead prices, even though the NGA
controlled about fifty percent of natural gas prices.
53
The second regulatory mechanism was private ordering through con-
tract.5 4 Pipelines entered into long-term contracts with producers under
47. Fox, Transforming an Industry by Agency Rulemaking: Regulation of Natural Gas
by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 23 LAND & WATER L. REv. 113-14 (1988); see
also Pierce, Reconstituting the Natural Gas Industry from Wellhead to Burnertip, 9 ENERGY
L.J. 1 (1988).
48. Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3351 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1982)); see
also, Allison, Natural Gas Pricing: The Eternal Debate, 37 BAYLOR L. REv. 1 (1985).
49. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717 et seq. (1982).
50. 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
51. See S. BREYER, supra note 26; S. BREYER & P. MAcAvoY, ENERGY REGULATION BY
TmE FEDERAL POWER COMMUSSION (1974); M.E. SANDERS, supra note 26; A. TussiNG & C.
BARLow, supra note 26; Breyer & MacAvoy, The Natural Gas Shortage and the Regulation
of Natural Gas Producers, 86 HAv. L. REv. 941 (1973).
52. Allison, supra note 48.
53. See Pierce, supra note 47, at 11; see also Allison, supra note 48; Note, Legislative
History of the Natural Gas Policy Act: Title I, 59 TEx. L. REv. 101 (1980).
54. See Pierce, Natural Gas Regulation, Deregulation, and Contracts, 68 VA. L. REv.
63 (1982).
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which the pipelines were obligated to take-or-pay for up to ninety-five
percent of the contract amount of natural gas." When gas is in short
supply, take-or-pay contracts with high take percentages work a fair ex-
change. The pipeline has a reliable supplier and the producer has a reliable
cash flow for exploration and production. In the mid-1970s, a gas shortage
forced pipelines to curtail supplies, making take-or-pay contracts attractive
6
Unfortunately, when an abundance of gas developed in the 1980s, high
take-or-pay obligations prevented pipelines from shopping around for lower
priced natural gas, thus distorting the market.
The gas market was so distorted in the 1980s that while energy prices
were falling generally, natural gas prices were not, despite a decline in
demand. Consequently, this situation created a surplus of natural gas. This
market dislocation, together with the NGPA's regulatory response, had
severe adverse consequences:
From 1978 through 1987, the NGPA has had extremely unfavorable
effects on all segments of the industry. Consumer prices have been
well above the level that would exist in a competitive market. At
the same time, the existence of a large surplus of gas throughout
the period has forced the shut in of many gas supplies and has
driven a large number of gas producers into bankruptcy. Simulta-
neously, interstate pipelines have incurred contractual liabilities of
$11.7 billion for gas they are obligated to pay for but unwilling to
take because the market will not permit them to sell gas in the
volumes and at the prices to which they are committed by contract1
7
Even with an oversupply of natural gas, the cheaper gas could not get
to market because pipelines were locked into inefficient contractual obli-
gations. Not surprisingly, courts did not rush in to rewrite contracts for
such sophisticated parties and were content to let risk fall according to
where the parties contractually assigned itA8
To take advantage of the emerging market, pipelines, producers, and
consumers all petitioned FERC for relief. Through minimum billings, pipe-
lines tried to insure their cash flow to pay their fixed and variable costs.
Pipelines also tried to get access to the surplus market through special
marketing programs. Producers simply wanted to get their gas to market
and supported the special marketing programs. Consumers, naturally, tried
55. See Medina, McKenzie & Daniel, Take or Litigate: Enforcing the Plain Meaning of
the Take-or-Pay Clause in Natural Gas Contracts, 40 ARK. L. REv. 185 (1986).
56. See North Carolina v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 584 F.2d 1003 (1978)
(discussing legality of curtailment policies); 15 US.C. §§ 3391-94 (1982) (NGPA curtailment
policies).
57. Pierce, supra note 47, at 11 (footnotes omitted).
58. See, e.g., Wagner & Brown v. ANR Pipeline Inc., 837 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1988)
(upholding district courts' dismissal of take-or-pay action deferring to primary jurisdiction of
FERC); Golsen v. Ong Western, Inc., 756 P.2d 1209 (Okla. 1988) (take-or-pay liability not
extinguished by force majeure clause).
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to avoid the imposition of "minimum bills" under which gas was more
costly than its market value. Also, some consumers protested the new
marketing programs from which they were excluded. There was a double
sting to the exclusion from the new marketing programs. Not only were
some, usually residential, consumers not able to buy the cheaper gas, they
also had to pay a higher portion of fixed costs not absorbed by the
beneficiaries of the new programs.
In response to these requests and to changing market conditions, FERC
attempted to loosen price, entry, and exit controls for the purpose of letting
gas flow more smoothly through the distribution system from producer to
end-user or, in industry jargon, from wellhead to burnertip. Clearly, pipe-
lines were the bottleneck in the natural gas fuel cycle. Thus, pipelines were
the target of FERC regulatory efforts.
5 9
The first notable response to the new gas market was the "special
marketing program" (SMP) in which FERC blessed an interstate pipeline's
attempt to move cheaper natural gas to fuel-switchable end-users, usually
industrial customers, at discounted rates.60 Discounting makes sense from
the pipeline's perspective as well as from the customer's. The pipeline can
retain old customers and attract new ones by making cheaper gas available.
Unfortunately, some customers, like local distribution companies (LDCs-
the local public utility) which serve residential consumers and small busi-
nesses, have a difficult time switching fuels or suppliers. Not only are LDCs
and their customers6' stuck with the higher priced natural gas, they may be
forced to pick up the additional fixed costs that are not covered by the
discounted rate. The SMPs were judicially invalidated for precisely this
reason. Captive customers (residential users and small businesses) did not
have access to lower priced natural gas. 62 FERC had the right idea with the
SMP, but it failed to execute it in a nondiscriminatory way.
Along with SMPs, FERC engaged in a series of rulemakings aimed at
making the natural gas market more competitive. Depending on who's
position you accept, these rulemakings will either revolutionize the natural
gas industry or result in chaos and confusion. The first significant rule-
making was FERC Order No. 380,63 in which FERC declared that minimum
59. See Pierce, Reconsidering the Roles of Regulation and Competition in the Natural
Gas Industry, 97 HIv. L. REv. 345 (1983) (questioning need for pipeline regulation in today's
market); Note, Is Natural Gas Pipeline Regulation Worth the Fuss?, 40 STAN. L. REv. 753
(1988) (same).
60. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 25 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH)
61,220 (1983).
61. While LDCs can pass the higher cost of natural gas through to their customers, the
high prices will reduce demand, thus reducing LDC profits. Therefore, neither LDCs nor their
customers were happy with the SMP.
62. See Maryland People's Counsel v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 761 F.2d
768 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (MPC 1); 761 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (MPC I); 768 F.2d 450 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (MPC III).
63. Elimination of Variable Costs from Certain Natural Gas Pipeline Minimum Com-
modity Bill Provisions, Order No. 380, Midwestern Gas Transmission Co., 26 Fed. Energy
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commodity bills, which guaranteed the pipeline's recovery of fixed and
variable costs (including take-or-pay payments by the pipeline), were unjust
and unreasonable under the Natural Gas Act.
In Order No. 380, FERC held that the variable cost component of a
minimimum bill was anticompetitive because pipelines would try to recoup
these costs from some customers" and not from others. This generic
rulemaking prohibited the variable cost component. Later, in individual
proceedings, FERC ruled on, and invalidated, fixed cost minimum bills.65
Minimum billing restricted competition by limiting the ability of gas
purchasers to swing from one supplier to another. FERC reasoned that
automatic pass through of high gas costs due to take-or-pay liability in
times of plenty was unjust and unreasonable. 66 The United States Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld the restrictions on minimum billing,
but noted that Order No. 380 did not adequately address the take-or-pay
problem.67 Although the order prohibited pipelines from passing some
variable costs68 to some customers, it did not relieve pipelines from their
contractual obligations to producers at the other end of the distribution
system.
FERC has been grappling with the take-or-pay issue through a series
of very complicated rulemakings and associated litigation which is, as yet,
unresolved and unlikely to be resolved in the near term. These rulemaking
efforts are intended to open up the natural gas market and, because pipelines
form a natural bottleneck in the distribution system, the rulemakings were
aimed at the pipelines. More specifically, following the lead of the SMP,
the new regulations attempted a better utilization of the transportation
portion of pipeline business69 and a move toward open access of pipelines.
Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,318 (1984); see also Order No. 380-A, 28 Fed. Energy Reg.
Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,175; Order No. 380-C, 29 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH)
61,077; Order No. 380-D, 29 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,332 (1984).
64. Specifically, pipelines would try to recoup these costs from partial requirements
customers. A partial requirements customer is a customer who buys only a portion of its
energy needs from the pipeline.
65. Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 820 F.2d 733 (5th
Cir. 1987) (affirming FERC's elimination of pipeline company's fixed costs as unjust and
unreasonable), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 96 (1988).
66. FERC derives its power to declare contract provisions unjust and unreasonable from
the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717c and 717d (1982). See Office of Consumers' Counsel
v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 783 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (OCC i); 826 F.2d
1136 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (OCC 11); 842 F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (OCC 111) (finding certain
contract provision including take-or-pay provisions unreasonable and violative of § 5 of NGA).
67. Wisconsin Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 770 F.2d 1144 (D.C. Cir
1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1114 (1986).
68. Fixed cost provisions of minimum billings were addressed in individual proceedings.
See, e.g., Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 820 F.2d 733
(5th Cir. 1987).
69. Pipelines perform two functions: they either buy gas from producers and then
transport and sell it to customers, or they simply transport gas to customers who have already
purchased it from pipelines or other marketers. When pipelines buy and sell to customers this
is known as a "bundled transaction." An "unbundled transaction" occurs when pipelines only
transport the gas.
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Pipelines serve two functions: (1) They buy gas from producers and
then market the gas to customers; or (2) they transport gas that the pipeline's
customers have purchased from producers. In Order No. 43670 the FERC
proposed to open access for captive customers and others who find it
difficult to switch by separating pipelines' merchant and transportation
roles. According to Professor William Fox, Order No. 436 has four objec-
tives:
(1) Non-discriminatory transportation for all shippers if a pipeline
volunteers to open access;
(2) relaxed ratemaking treatment of piplines' take-or-pay buyout
agreements;
(3) expedited and easier treatment for some new construction and
abandonments; and
(4) price protection for some customers of pipelines which enjoyed
the advantages of "old" gas.
71
Every element of the natural gas industry challenged Order No. 436. In
Associated Gas Distributors v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
7 2
the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit remanded Order
No. 436 to FERC for FERC's failure to relieve pipelines from their take-
or-pay burdens. Associated Gas Distributors is a landmark decision for
natural gas regulation. Although the case did result in a remand, the opinion
largely accepted FERC's regulatory efforts. The D.C. Circuit upheld FERC's
jurisdiction to promulgate open access provisions as long as the provisions
were nondiscriminatory. The court also sustained the order's flexible rate
treatment which allows pipelines to set rates within a zone of reasonableness
and to give discounts rather than have the pipelines tied to a single cost-
based rate. 73 More innovatively, the D.C. Circuit upheld regulations which,
70. See Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 50 Fed.
Reg. 42,408 (1985) (Order No. 436), modified, 50 Fed. Reg. 52,217 (1985) (Order No. 436-
A), modified, 51 Fed. Reg. 6,398 (1986) (Order No. 436-B).
71. Fox, supra note 47, at 125. Professor Pierce characterizes the "voluntariness" of
the transportation provisions of Order No. 436 as follows:
The effect of Order No. 436 on any pipeline that becomes an equal access carrier
is to force the pipeline to compete with others-producers, other pipelines and gas
marketing companies-in the sales market. As a result, the pipeline no longer has
monopoly power in the sales market, the monopoly rationale for regulating pipeline
sales is eliminated, and the pipeline no longer can use regulation of the sales market
as a means of protecting itself from competition.
Pierce, supra note 47, at 25 (footnotes omitted); see alfo Griggs, Restructuring the Natural
Gas Industry: Order No. 436 and Other Regulatory Initiatives, 7 ENERGY L. J. 71 (1986).
72. 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1469 (1988).
73. FERC is experimenting with a form of "Ramsey" rates. Professor Pierce explains:
The FERC undertakes this task in Order No. 436 by adopting Ramsey pricing
principles for pipeline transportation. A pipeline can charge any rate between a
ceiling based on its fully allocated cost of transportation and a floor based on its
variable cost. The difference between the two is, in aggregate, the pipeline's fixed
costs, and the amount by which the rate charged a customer exceeds the floor is
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under certain circumstances, allow pipeline customers to modify their con-
tracts with pipelines unilaterally by converting a percentage of their contract
demand from a gas purchase obligation to an "unbundled" transportation
obligation. Finally, the court remanded the order to FERC because the
"Commission's apparent insousiance on take-or-pay taints the package." 74
After being rebuffed by the court three times for not adequately handling
the take-or-pay issue,75 FERC responded with Order No. 500.76 Natural gas
lawyers Sheila Hollis and Edward LeDuc point out that the 500 series 'of
FERC orders intends to remedy the defects of Order No. 436. Hollis and
LeDuc assert that in Associated Gas Distributors, the United States Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit noted that the 500 series remedies the
defects by:
(1) providing that an open-access pipeline may refuse to transport
producer-owned gas unless the producer offers the pipeline a
take-or-pay credit;
(2) adopting two alternative mechanisms for pipeline recovery of
past buy-down or buy-out of take-or-pay liabilities;
(3) establishing principles for earlier recovery of future gas supply
charges; and
(4) eliminating the contract demand reduction.
77
Order No. 500 splits take-or-pay liability among customers, 78 pipelines, and
producers. According to FERC Chair Martha Hesse, the underlying philos-
ophy of Order No. 500 is " 'spreading the pain,' to the end of making
open access 'a fact of life in the gas industry.' -179
that customer's contribution to the pipeline's fixed costs.
Pierce, supra note 47, at 25 (footnotes omitted). But see Farmers Union Central Exchange,
Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 734 F.2d 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (court remanding
for reconsideration FERC's "flexible" rate scheme for oil pipeline because of failure to justify
that rates will be just and reasonable).
74. Associated Gas Dist. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 824 F.2d 981, 1044
(D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1469 (1988).
75. The D.C. Circuit has told FERC to look more closely at the take-or-pay issue in
Maryland Peoples' Counsel v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 761 F.2d 768 (D.C.
Cir. 1985); Associated Gas Distributors v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 824 F.2d
981 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1469 (1988); and Consolidated Edison Co. of
New York v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 823 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (1985
FERC abandonment policy remanded because it contained same "pervasive defect" of avoiding
take-or-pay issue found in Order No. 380 and Order No 436).
76. See Regulation of Natural Gas After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 52 Fed. Reg.
30,334 (1987) (Order No. 500), modified, 52 Fed. Reg. 39,507 (1987) (Order No. 500-A),
modified, 52 Fed. Reg. 39,630 (1987) (Order No. 500-B), modified, 52 Fed. Reg. 48,986 (1987)
(Order No. 500-C), modified, 53 Fed. Reg. 8,439 (1988) (Order No. 500-D).
77. Hollis & LeDuc, Order No. 500 et al.: The FERC's Long and Winding Road to
Take-or-Pay Resolution, 2 NAT. GAs LAW. J. 1, 11 (Mar. 1988).
78. See Romo, A Natural Gas Policy Update - Spreading the Pain: Part II, PuB. UTn.
FORT., May 26, 1988, at 40-41 (quoting Nevada Senator Harry Reid warning pipelines that
requests for residential rate increases may not be looked on with favor).
79. See id. at 41.
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In their attempt to pry open access to markets through pipelines and
to resolve the multi-billion dollar take-or-pay problem, Order Nos. 436 and
500 form the heart of the regulatory revolution in the natural gas industry.
Still, FERC has been active on other fronts, moving toward the same
objective of promoting a more competitive natural gas market. In Order
No. 451,1 0 FERC effectively extended price deregulation to "old" gas by
setting a price ceiling above current market prices. The price ceiling allowed
prices to fluctuate as if a workably competitive market was determining
prices. Order No. 451 also creates a regulatory mechanism for producers
and purchasers to renegotiate their gas purchase contracts in light of the
gas surplus.8' Finally, Order No. 451 eliminates "vintaging," which has
been ascribed as the cause of the gas shortages in the 1970s and high gas
prices in the 1980s.2
Recent Order No. 49083 moves gas regulation in another direction. With
Order No. 490, FERC proposes to make abandonment -easier and to
encourage production and a national market,8 4 thus loosening the Natural
Gas Act's market entry and exit restrictions. 5 FERC reasoned that as a
result of conditions that the NGPA created, "continuation of the service
obligation after the contract has expired is no longer required by the public
convenience and necessity because it prevents market forces from operating
efficiently."8s6 Order No. 490, then, is intended to reduce federal regulation
of entry and exit from the market and to supplement the limited federal
regulation with private contract.
Finally, and most recently, FERC issued a final rule, Order No. 497,87
aimed at curbing anticompetitive marketing practices. Specifically, the order
prohibits an interstate pipeline providing transportation services from giving
preferential treatment to an affiliated marketer.8 With a surplus of natural
80. 51 Fed. Reg. 22,168 (1986); see also Shoneman & McConnell, FERC Order No. 451:
Freedom (Almost) for Old Gas, 7 ENERGY L. J. 299 (1986).
81. This rule is also under current judicial review in Mobil Exploration Co. v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Comm'n, Docket No. 86-4950 (5th Cir. 1986).
82. "Vintaging" was a pricing concept developed during the setting of national rates by
rulemaking. Its simplest formulation is a two-tier system in which rates for "old gas," i.e.,
gas produced before a certain date, were set at a low level generally reflecting the embedded
(or historic) cost of producing that gas. "New gas," gas produced after a certain date, would
be priced higher in order to encourage producers to invest money in gas exploration and
production. Unfortunately, the old gas prices were generally below the marginal cost of the
gas being produced and, therefore, this pricing system discouraged production. See Pierce,
supra note 47, at 28-29; see also Shoneman & McConnell, supra note 80.
83. FERC Order No. 490, 53 Fed. Reg. 4121 (1988) (18 C.F.R. Part 157).
84. See 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1982) (certificate of public convenience and necessity is
entry requirement); 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (1982) (abandonment approval is exit restriction).
85. See FERC Order No. 490-A, Abandonment of Sales and Purchases of Natural Gas
Under Expired, Terminated, or Modified Contracts, 53 Fed. Reg. 29,002 (1988) (18 C.F.R.
Part 157) (order denying rehearing and clarifying final rule).
86. Id. at 29,003.
87. 53 Fed. Reg. 22,139 (1988) (18 C.F.R. Parts 161, 250, 284).
88. See Midwest Gas Users Ass'n v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 833 F.2d 341
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
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gas, the gas marketing segment of the industry mushroomed. Gas marketers
act as middlemen between producers and sellers as the marketers try to take
advantage of the large spot market in gas. As long as marketers are
unaffiliated with pipelines, the market should work more or less smoothly,
although this has not been the case with affiliated marketers. Order No.
497 wants to curb abuses by affiliate marketers.
With Order No. 497, the FERC revolution has come full circle. The
agency has moved from a situation in which regulations impeded the free
flow of natural gas in a market of abundance and artificial price ceilings
to a situation approaching a free market. Segments of the industry with
anticompetitive market power, most notably interstate pipelines, threaten
this free market. Order No. 497, then, is symbolic of the contemporary
circumstance in which deregulation of one segment of the fuel cycle leads
directly to reregulation, rather than to no regulation at all.
B. FERC Electricity Initiatives
From the end of World War II until the late 1960s, the electricity
market remained stable. During this period, demand grew at a predictable
seven percent per annum, thus making capacity planning easy. Since the
mid-1970s, however, the electricity market has experienced a radical tran-
sition. First, the rate of growth in demand has fluctuated and declined
appreciably as the price of electricity increased.A9 Today, demand averages
between two percent and three percent per year ° Second, an industry that
was once thought to exhibit characteristics of inelastic demand demonstrated
that it was more elastic than once believed. 91 The direct consequence of an
historic linear seven percent growth rate and a current two to three percent
growth with elastic demand was that electric utilities found themselves with
excess capacity92 Public utility commissions and state legislatures responded
by passing regulations and legislation shielding consumers from paying for
capital investment that yielded no electricity.93 The consensus interpretation
89. Between 1930 and 1970, growth in demand for electricity averaged 7 percent annually.
Between 1970 and 1983, in contrast, the annual growth rate dropped off to 2.5 percent. Since
1982, net electric generation has grown at an average rate of 2.6 percent per year. See
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFF., FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THE U.S. ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY
(1986); DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY INFo. AGENCY, ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL (1986).
90. Yokell & Voilette, Market Structure and Opportunities in the Electric Utility Industry
Today, PuB. UT. FORT. Jan. 7, 1988, at 9.
91. Compare K. HowE & E. RASMUSSEN, PUBLIC UTIrrY ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 20
(1982) (asserting that electricity industry is inelastic) with P. JosKow & R. SCHMALENSEE,
MARKETS FOR POWER: AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTRIC UTIITY DEREGULATION 156 (1985) (noting
that electricity industry is elastic) and L. HYMAN, AMERCA'S ELECTRIC UTnnmms: PAST PRESENT,
AND FUTURE 43 (2d ed. 1985) (same).
92. See A. KAUFMAN, K. KELLY & R. HEMPHILL, COMMISSION TREATMENT OF OVERCA-
PAcrrY IN Tim ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY (1984).
93. See D. ANDERSON, REGULATORY POITICS AND ELECTRIC UTIrrEs: A CASE STUDY IN
POLITICAL ECONOMY (1981) (describing proconsumer shift in public utility commissions due to
change in market); W. GoRm-s, TE POLITICS OF PUBLIC UTIITY REGULATION (1983) (same);
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of these market changes is that the electricity market is becoming more
competitive. Excess capacity, slowed growth in demand, greater price elas-
ticity of demand, new entrants in the generation end of the fuel cycle,
94
and merger, acquisition, and spin-off activities all evince a competitive
climate never seen before in the electricity industry. 95
However, a paradox accompanies increased competition. Although more
options are available for the generation of electricity on the supply side,
and although consumers have more options to choose from on the demand
side, these options are not available to all consumers. Specifically, pur-
chasing flexibility exists for large industrial consumers but does not filter
down to smaller customers:
Yet those smaller, captive, residential and commercial customers
will bear increased costs and reliability burdens created by those
who are granted such purchasing flexibility.
By ensuring service to captive customers who are unable to leave
the system ... utilities will incur higher costs. These costs will
make them less likely to compete with their unregulated counterparts
for the more profitable segments of the market. This in turn will
make it increasingly difficult to serve their customers economically.
96
Stimulated by the growingly competitive market and the attendant
complications, FERC has been very active on the electricity side of its
docket. In a controversial9 series of proposed rulemakings, FERC is grav-
itating toward greater reliance on market-like competition. The market-like
competition is expected to align more closely'supply, demand, and price,
rather than have prices artificially set by federal or state regulators.
FERC's free market favoritism is theoretically sound. However, there
are structural impediments in the electricity industry, just as there are
structural impediments in the natural gas industry, that make complete
P. NAVARRO, Ti DamMNo OF AmERICA: Tsm RAL CosTs oF ELEcTRic UTinrY REGuIrATORY
FAIuRE (1985) (poor regulation has contributed to underinvestment in electric plants); Olson,
Statutes Prohibiting Cost Recovery for Cancelled Nuclear Power Plants: Constitutional? Pro-
Consumer?, 28 DENVER U.L. Rav. 345 (1985) (discussing long-term and high-cost consequences
of pro-consumer legislation).
94. See generally Lennon & Meyers, Net Energy Use Impacts of PURPA Implementation,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., May 12, 1988, at 28.
95. See Kirsten, Deregulation and Reorganization in the Electric Utility Industry, PuB.
UTI. FORT., Sept. 3, 1987, at 11; O'Connor, Levin, Cahill & Keenan, The Transition to
Competition in the Electric Utility Industry, 8 ENERGY L. & PoV'Y 223 (1988); Scherer,
Powering America to a More Productive Future, Pun. UTI. FORT., June 9, 1988, at 17;
Smartt, The Electric Utility Executives' Forum, PuB. UTn. FORT., June 9, 1988, at 78;
Studness, Electric Utility Capacity Planning and U.S. Energy Policy, PuB. UT. FORT. July
7, 1988, at 33.
96. Scherer, supra note 95, at 19.
- 97. See generally Romo, 1988: The Year the FERC Shook Electricity, PUB. UT. FORT.,
Sept. 1, 1988, at 29.
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transition from regulation to market extremely unlikely, if not completely
impossible. Specifically, like the natural gas industry, the electricity industry
may be able to promote more competition in the generation segment of its
fuel cycle, but because the transmission segment exhibits monopoly char-
acteristics, the government must regulate the transmission segment. The
government must regulate transmission to prevent captive customers, small
commercial and residential users, from being forced to absorb excess utility
costs. Recent FERC activities addressing this new environment can be
divided into rulemaking and transmission.
1. FERC Rulemaking
FERC's rulemaking activities aspire to two goals. First, FERC wants
to stop administratively setting wholesale rates and to have something like
a competitive market set the rates. 9 Second, following the successful lead
of PURPA, which opened up markets in cogeneration and small power
production, 99 FERC proposes to expand generation options even further.
Until the mid-1970s, virtually all electricity produced in the country
came from investor-owned utilities, municipally-owned utilities, rural electric
cooperatives, or federally run hydroelectric projects. 1°° The "energy crisis,"
however, stimulated policymakers to rethink assumptions about electricity
production, as well as assumptions about oil dependence. On the electricity
side, policymakers tried to increase energy efficiency by encouraging con-
servation and by finding new, cheaper suppliers. In other words, policy-
makers wanted to find alternatives to traditional public utilities.
PURPA attempted to do this by creating a new electricity market.
According to FERC regulations implementing PURPA, a nonutility elec-
tricity producer qualifying as a cogenerator'01 or small power producer, 0 2
thus becoming a "qualifying facility" (QF), is entitled to certain benefits. 03
98. See, e.g., Barker, A Workable Test of a Workably Competitive Bulk Power Market,
Pun. Urm. FORT., April 14, 1988, at 13, 14. James Barker sets out a test for creating such a
market:
It is proposed that for a selling utility to qualify as a being approved to charge
market-based rates for bulk power interchange and transmission service, there must
be at least two other potential sellers of comparable services to the buying utility.
Therefore, each buyer should have, at a minimum, three viable suppliers for a
service in order to establish a workably competitive interchange market.
Id.
99. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 210, 92 Stat. 3117,
3144-3147 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (1982)).
100. There are approximately 250 investor-owned electric utilities which supply about 78
percent of all electricity generated in the United States. The remaining electricity comes from
approximately 2,200 electric systems owned and operated by state and municipal governments
(10%); 1,000 cooperatively owned systems (2:5%); and federal agencies (10%). See C. PmuLis,
T~m REGuLATION OF PUBLic UTrrrras: THEoRY AN PRACTICE 538-39 (1984); L. HY.A, supra
note 91, at 117.
101. 18 C.F.R. § 292.205 (1987).
102. 18 C.F.R. § 292.204 (1988).
103. 18 C.F.R. § 292 subpart C (1988).
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The primary benefit is that utilities are obligated by law to purchase and
to sell electricity to QFs at the utilities' avoided cost. Avoided cost means
the cost that the utility would incur in producing a unit of electricity or the
cost that the utility would incur if the utility purchased a unit of electricity
from another source (i.e., the market). 4 Although FERC regulations did
not require the utility to set the price at the full avoided cost, 05 that is, the
cost to the utility, the Supreme Court sustained a rule requiring the full
payment.1
06
If a utility charges the full avoided cost rather than something less than
a utility's costs and more than a QF's costs, consumers do not benefit from
this new market. However, consumers do not lose in the short run and are
potential long-run beneficiaries because a new lower-priced electricity market
is being created. Therefore, the law allows a QF that can produce more
electricity than it needs at a cost lower than the utility's cost to make a
profit on those sales.
The PURPA scheme appears successful because it brought new entrants
into the market and it increased the energy efficiency of electricity produc-
tion. 107 Indeed, utility critics of the full avoided cost scheme disparage the
blossoming of QFs as "PURPA machines." Building on that success, FERC
has issued three notices of proposed rulemaking (NOPRs) which have the
potential to revolutionize the federal regulation of electricity, no less so
than FERC's natural gas revolution."' s
Two NOPRs concern avoided cost determinations. In Docket No. 88-
5,109 FERC proposes that state regulatory authorities and nonregulated
104. 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(6) (1988).
105. Until recently, FERC rules permitted states to charge rates higher than a utility's
full avoided cost. Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc., 92 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 1, 14
(1988). That rule has been rescinded and today states can charge rates no higher than full
avoided cost. Id. at 4.
106. American Paper Institute, Inc. v. American Electric Power Service Corp., 461 U.S.
402, 413 (1983).
107. See Lennon & Meyers, Net Energy Use Impacts of PURPA Implementation, Pun.
UTL. FORT., May 12, 1988, at 28, 31, 33 (discussing how PURPA brought new entrants into
market and increased energy efficiency of electricity production). Lennon and Meyers also find
that QF electricity has reduced reliance on oil and natural gas generated electricity. Id. at 36-
37. The "threat" of QF power, or the "threat" of the full avoided cost obligation imposed
on utilities has instigated some utilities to offer "discount" rates to industrial consumers. See
Norris, 1987 - The Year in Review, Pun. UTm. FORT., Jan. 7, 1988, at 42. The discount is
that the utility will lower the industrial consumer's rate if the consumer agrees not to build a
cogeneration facility. Bain, State Regulation of "Anti-cogeneration" Contracts, Pua. UTL.
FORT., June 23, 1988, at 43.
108. See 53 Fed. Reg. 9324-27 (1988) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35 & 293) (proposed
March 16, 1988) (describing NOPR for regulations governing bidding programs); id. at 9327-
31 (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 38 & 382) (proposed March 16, 1988) (describing NOPR
for regulations concerning independent power producers); id. at 9331-34 (to be codified at 18
C.F.R. pt. 292) (proposed March 16, 1988) (describing NOPR for administrative determination
of full avoided costs, sales of power to qualifying facilities, and interconnection facilities).
109. See 53 Fed. Reg. 9324-27 (1988) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35 & 293) (proposed
March 16, 1988).
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electric utilities implement bidding procedures as a means of establishing
rates for QF power purchases. This proposed rule would create an artificial
market for price setting and would avoid a fixed reliance on utilities' full
avoided cost. If successful, such bidding would encourage cogeneration and
small power production, energy conservation, efficient use of facilities, and
equitable rates. 10 FERC believes that "bidding has the potential for elimi-
nating the seemingly endless debates over what alternative sources of supply
are truly avoided by the purchasing utility," because "avoided cost could
be derived simply and directly from the prices offered by competing suppliers
in the bidding process.""' Under the proposed rule, states would have the
option of setting QF power rates either through a "competitive" bidding
system or administratively.
The second rulemaking, FERC Docket No. 88-6, provides guidelines
for states choosing the administrative option.12 Briefly, this NOPR distin-
guishes between energy and capacity costs, which can be roughly defined
as variable and fixed costs respectively,"' to insure that purchasing utilities
are not making capacity payments when their capacity needs have been met.
Put another way, FERC does not want a rate structure that encourages
unnecessary capital expansion. Docket No. RM 88-6 also provides guidelines
on supplemental, maintenance, back-up, and interruptible power to QFs,
and guidelines on ownership of interconnection and transmission facilities
by QFs.
QFs must satisfy FERC regulations before they are entitled to the
benefits. Understandably, the regulations are somewhat restrictive because
110. Id. at 9324.
111. See FEDERAL ENERGY Guman, s, FERC STATuTEs & REGULATioNS 32,455, at p.
32,025. FERC notes that several states have or are considering a bidding process to supplant
administratively determined avoided costs. These states include Maine, Massachusetts, and
California (have bidding statutes); Vermont and Michigan (propose to use bidding); Texas (has
structured form of negotiation); Connecticut, New Jersey, Idaho, Illinois, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia (under
consideration). Id. at 32,051 n.34.
112. Administrative Determination of Full Avoided Costs, Sales of Power to Qualifying
Facilities, and Interconnection Facilities, FERC Dkt. No. I RM88-6-000 (Mar. 16, 1988)
(amending 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.304-.306) (1987), FEDERAL ENERGY GuiDELn~s, FERC STATUTES
& REaULAITIONs 32,457, at p. 32,155 [hereinafter Administrative Determination of Full
Avoided Costs].
113. "The avoided costs of electric utilities can include both energy and capacity costs.
Energy costs are the variable costs associated with the incremental production of electric
energy. They represent the cost of fuel, and some operating and maintenance expenses. Under
certain circumstances, avoided energy costs can be zero or negative. At such times, electric
utilities may be relieved of the obligation to purchase energy from QFs.
Capacity costs are the costs associated with providing the capability to meet the demand
for electric energy. Capacity costs may be incurred by a utility in order to build generating
facilities, institute conservation and load management programs, or purchase power on the
wholesale market. Under FERC's current regulations, capacity payments need to be made
when, and only when, the purchase or construction of capacity wiil be avoided by the
purchasing electric utility as a result of its purchase of QF power." Id. at 32,157 (footnotes
omitted).
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public utilities have invested hundreds of billions of dollars pursuant to a
scheme of regulation that is over one hundred years old. By so investing,
these public utilities have established expectations about their markets. While
QFs contribute only one percent of the nation's electricity,"14 that one
percent represents a five-fold increase over estimates of QF generated
electricity." 5 With this success, FERC hopes to expand this new electricity
market even further by promoting new sources of electricity generation
beyond PURPA inspired cogeneration and small power production.
In the third NOPR, Docket RM88-4," 6 FERC proposes the creation of
a new entity in the electricity market, independent power producers (IPPs).
Like QFs, IPPs will compete with traditional public utilities, as well as
between themselves, for a share of an emerging market. The fact that
traditional public utilities are producing electricity at a higher cost than
other producers may indicate that traditional public utilities have reached
their technological capacity." 7 Through IPPs, the FERC intends to encour-
age producers to supply electricity at a cost lower than the electricity supplied
by traditional utilities.
According to the NOPR, an IPP is defined as a seller of electricity
that:
(1) [i]s not located in a retail service franchise territory possessed
by the seller (or any of its affiliates), and
(2) [i]s not served by transmission facilities that are essential to the
customer and that are controlled by the seller (or any affiliate of
the seller)." 8
The premise behind the definition is that if a seller does not have a franchise
area and does not own transmission facilities, namely, the seller is not
structured like a classic public utility, then the seller will not have market
power and can be left largely unregulated.
IPPs will differ from traditional public utilities and QFs precisely
because IPPs will feel a lighter touch of the regulatory hand. FERC is
gambling that less regulated IPPs will help expand the electricity market;
114. See Lennon & Meyers, supra note 107, at 29.
115. In 1980, FERC estimated that there would be 2,636 MW of QF capacity installed.
In fact, by 1985 there was nearly fives times that amount (12,120 MW). Administrative
Determination of Full Avoided Costs, supra note 112, at 32,186 n.42. This figure is low
because it represents only the amount of power QFs sold; it does not account for the electricity
the QF used nor does it account for self-generation.
116. See Regulations Governing Independent Power Producers, FERC Dkt. No. RM-88-
4-000 (Mar. 16, 1988), FEDERAL ENERGY GUIDELINES, FERC STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
32456, at p. 32,101.
117. Id. at 32,115, 32,141 n. 101.
118. Id. at 32,110. The FERC definition also requires that all sales be made from an
independent power facility (IPF), which is defined as a facility or portion of a facility that is
not in any utility's rate base and is not otherwise afforded cost-of-service treatment. Thus,
the IPP does not get a competitive edge by having all or a portion of its costs protected by
traditional regulation.
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that competition will increase by promoting new entrants; and, that greater
efficiencies will be realized. The NOPR proposes that IPP rates will be set
according to a bidding process similar to the bidding process that sets QF
power rates. In other words, IPP ratemaking will be market-determined
rather than cost-based. 119 This attempt to reform traditional ratemaking
makes rate regulation more competitive and attempts to rationalize electricity
pricing by treating the new class of suppliers uniformly. "[The Commission
believes it can promote the most efficient production and allocation of
wholesale electric energy and provide the lowest cost reliable energy to
consumers by encouraging additional supply options for utilities through
streamlined regulation of IPPs.'1I
2°
The economic theory behind IPPs is that IPPs, as new entrants to the
power market, must offer electricity below the buyer's incremental cost, or
the IPP will fail. If the IPP succeeds, the presence of more suppliers will
increase competition.
Who will buy electricity from these new producers? Generally, IPP
customers will be franchised utilities that often will be vertically integrated
with their own generation, distribution, and most importantly, transmission
facilities. A utility will buy electricity in the market when electricity is
cheaper to buy than it is to produce. Because the integrated utility will
already own transmission facilities, the acquisition cost of the electricity
will be low. Further, and more importantly, utility customers also have a
stable market and a service obligation to retail customers-utilities need
electricity to stay in business.
An IPP can take three forms. First, an IPP can consist of industrial
IPPs that generate more power than they consume, and sell the excess.
Second, an IPP can be a nonutility, nonindustrial entity with small con-
sumption needs that exists to generate and sell power. Third, a utility IPP
sells power outside of its franchise area.
2 1
IPPs, then, offer wholesale consumers another supply option. IPPs
differ from QFs in that utilities are not obligated to purchase IPP power.
Contracts between IPPs and utilities will determine the extent to which
utilities will become obligated to purchase IPP power. Utilities then will use
contract power to satisfy their service obligation. Of course, for the scheme
119. Traditional cost-of-service ratemaking may well become a regulatory relic. Such
ratemaking works well when the industry is expanding and, therefore, costs are declining. In
such a situation, cost-based ratemaking encourages the regulated entity such as a public utility,
to invest more in capital expansion. When costs are rising, however, too much investment in
plants leads to excess capacity and overinvestment in plant. Overinvestment, in turn, leads to
regulators trimming rate increase requests which can lead to underinvestment. See id. at 32,106-
32,109. See also, P. NAVARRO, supra note 93 (discussing tendency to underinvest under
traditional scheme of public utility regulation); J. ToMAtI, NUCLEAR PoWER. TRANSFORmAnON
79-101 (1987) (discussing tendency to overinvest); Averch & Johnson, Behavior of the Firm
Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 Am. EcoN. REv. 1052 (1962) (same).
120. Regulations Governing Independent Power Producers, RM88-4-000 (March 16, 1988),
FEDERAL ENERGY GUIDEINES, FERC STATUTES & REGULATIONS 32,456, at p. 32,101.
121. Id. at 32,112.
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to work the purchasing utilities must have the IPP power transmitted into
the purchasing utilities' operating systems or power pools. Although the
NOPR does not address interconnections between IPPs and existing power
pools, these connections must take place.
2. Transmission Access-The Next Frontier
A recent investment bank report on the status of the electric industry
concluded that more economical and efficient operation of the nation's
electric system will produce an overall savings of $3.43 billion per year or
about $52 per "average" consumer per year.'1 The bulk of these savings
can result from power pooling, that is, the consolidation among numerous
utilities of generation, transmission, and distribution facilities. 123 Accord-
ingly, transmission access is central to gaining these economies of scale.
"Existing high-voltage transmission lines between the consolidating service
areas will enable this economy to be realized, provided transmission capacity
is available over the specific intertie(s) needed at the time the transmission
capacity is needed. "1u
Recall that an IPP is defined as not controlling transmission facilities.
Consequently, an IPP does not gain and exercise market power. Yet, for
the IPP proposal to function at all, transmission is an obvious necessity.
Also, if FERC is serious about restructuring the electricity market through
competitive bidding, then transmission is the key to FERC's success as well.
Therefore, as in the natural gas market, the transmission segment of the
electricity industry is becoming the focus of the next generation of federal
energy regulations.'7 Unfortunately, neither FERC nor Congress has pro-
ceeded to clarify the federal government's authority to compel transmission
122. SHEARsoN LEHMAN HuTrroN, ELECTRIC UTmrrms: THE CASE FOR CONSOLIDATION PART
1 10 (March 18, 1988).
123. See Pierce, A Proposal to Deregulate the Market for Bulk Power, 72 VA. L. REv.
1183, 1191 (1986) (defining power pooling); id. at 1191-97 (concluding that present industry
structure makes inefficient use of power pooling).
124. SHEAESON LEHMAN HTrroN, supra note 122, at 10 (emphasis added). Virtually all
commentators agree that transmission is a natural monopoly and that access provides the key
to realizing further economies of scale. Professor Richard Pierce, a proponent of widespread
deregulation in bulk power sales, also notes the need for access:
The economies of scale in high voltage transmission are so large that transmission
is a natural monopoly. Although transmission accounts for only two percent of the
total cost of electricity, access to transmission facilities is critical to the ability of
the generation segment of the industry to take advantage of the substantial economies
of scale and coordination potentially available in operations.
Pierce, supra note 123, at 1188; see also id. at 1215-18 (discussing access to transmission lines
as means of constraining transmission monopoly).
125. Transmission in the electricity industry, like transmission in the natural gas and
telecommunications industries, is a bottleneck and exhibits market power. See Pierce, supra
note 123, at 1212-30 (discussing how limited number of transmission facilities allows owners
of transmission facilities to exercise market power).
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access through interconnections, power pooling, and wheeling. 126 Instead,
access to the electricity transmission grid is a hodge-podge of federal
common law rulings and interpretations greatly restricting FERC's power
to order access.
Under the Federal Power Act and the Public Utilitites Regulatory
Policies Act, FERC has exercised limited power to order interconnections
and wheeling.' 7 Because the nation's approximately 250 investor-owned
utilities own most of the transmission lines, 21 FERC historically has been
reluctant to order one private company to open its access to other private
companies. FERC has preferred, instead, to have the companies negotiate
arrangements among themselves. Although the Supreme Court has ruled
that a federal district court can order a utility not to block transmission
access for anticompetitive purposes, the Court noted that the Federal Power
Act did not authorize the agency to compel access.
29
The explicit language of pertinent federal legislation seems to give FERC
a good deal of authority over tranmission access. The application of that
legislation, however, and FERC's own interpretations generally have limited
FERC's jurisdiction. The Federal Power Act authorizes FERC to order
interconnection upon the application of state utility commissions or persons
engaged in transmission or sale of electric energy, if the interconnection is
in the public interest and will not burden the public utility.130 PURPA
further authorizes FERC to order the physical connection of transmission
facilities and any necessary increases in transmission capacity when FERC
finds that the interconnection is in the public interest, optimizes the efficient
use of facilities or resources, or improves the reliability of the electric
126. "Interconnection" occurs when a generating facility physically connects with another
entity's transmission lines. "Power pooling" occurs when a group of generating facilities agree
to share capacity and transmission facilities. "Wheeling" occurs when one generator uses the
transmission facilities of another entity to sell its power to a third party customer.
One of the points that Commissioner Charles Trabandt makes in his separate opinion
(concurring and dissenting) on the three NOPRs is that "the transmission access question
continues to be a major source of confusion and controversy. . ." and that the "Commission
[should] only address reform of transmission regulation on a generic, industrywide basis and
not piecemeal in the context" of the NOPRs. Opinion of Commissioner Charles A. Trabandt,
Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part, FERC Dkt. Nos. RM88-4-000; RM88-5-000; and
RM88-6-000 (Mar. 16, 1988), FEDERAL ENERGY GUIDELINES, FERC STATUTES & REGULATIONS
32,455, at p. 32,086.
127. See Pierce, supra note 123, at 1188 ("The FERC ... does not have the power to
order the owner of a transmission facility to transmit electricity across its lines for other
parties, a procedure known as 'wheeling' " (citing City of Paris v. Kentucky Util. Co., 41
F.P.C. 45 (1969)). Pierce also writes that under PURPA "Congress granted the FERC the
power to order wheeling in certain circumstances." Pierce, supra note 123 (citing 16 U.S.C.
§ 824j(b) (1982)). The conditions under which the FERC may exercise this power, however,
are so severely limited that they may never exist. See Southeastern Power Admin. v. Kentucky
Util. Co., 25 F.E.R.C. 61,204 (1983); id. at n.38.
128. See C. Pnm.ups, supra note 100; L. HyimiA, supra note 91.
129. Otter Tall Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
130. 16 U.S.C. § 824a(b) (1982).
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system.' 3' PURPA also authorizes FERC to order wheeling (the ordering of
a utility to provide transmission services to another utility) under similar
circumstances,'I as long as FERC first determines the relative economic
benefits and burdens of the parties.'3 3 Under both acts, power pooling, the
grouping together of several utilities and distributors to share transmisson
and capacity, is voluntary.
According to a recent government study,'3 FERC has not been aggres-
sive in the use of its transmission access power. Of sixty-two cases requesting
transmission services, FERC granted access fifteen times, denied access
nineteen times, compromised ten cases, and approved settlement eighteen
times.' The simple point is that although FERC seems to have the power
to order access and the physical facilities are available,' 36 transmission line
owners exercise significant market power in the use and ownership of their
lines. Clearly, if a market-like regulation is going to exist in the electricity
industry, the transmission access problem must be resolved with thorough
open access regulations or some sort of competitive bidding system in the
transmission segment, as well as in the generation segment.
37
131. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (1982 & Supp. 1988) (PURPA § 210).
132. 16 U.S.C. § 824i (1982 & Supp. 1988) (PURPA § 211).
133. 16 U.S.C. § 824k (1982) (PURPA § 212).
134. U.S. GENERAL ACCT. OFF., EL xCTic POWER TRANSMSION: FEDERAL ROLE IN SYsTEm
USE AND REGULATION, GAO/RCED-88-98 (April 1988).
135. Id. at 4. A slightly refined analysis of the data indicates that wheeling services, the
most frequently requested service, was granted in thirteen percent of the cases, denied in thirty-
three percent, and compromised fifty-four percent. In cases involving interconnections, seventy
percent granted the request, ten percent denied the request, and twenty percent settled. Most
often FERC based its decision to grant or deny requests on section 205 or section 206 of the
FPA, the ratemaking sections, rather than on the previously cited grants of authority.
The study also demonstrated that actual or constructive denial of access, anticompetitive
practices, and discriminatory practices or pricing were the most frequently litigated issues in
transmission access cases. "Constructive denial means that, while a transmission line owner
does not directly refuse access, the terms for access presented by the owner make access
impractical." Id. at 27.
136. See SnmA~soN LEmnAN HUTTON, supra note 122, at 6 ("What is important is that
adequate transmission capacity exists to enable power pooling economies to be achieved in
most of the country . .").
137. See O'Connor & Keenan, The Politics and Policy of Access to the Electric Utility
Transmission System, PUB. UTIL. FORT., July 7, 1988, at 11. O'Connor and Keenan present
an interesting analysis of the transmission access problem and conclude that there may be an
"historical inevitability" about the resolution of the issue.
O'Connor and Keenan note the similarities between access in the natural gas, telecom-
munications, and electric industries and also point out three stages in the development of the
problem. First, a transportation problem is precipitated at the commodity end of the fuel
cycle, i.e., a surplus of product or potential product exists waiting to get to market. Second,
vertically integrated incumbents resist open access arguing variously that reliability will suffer
and/or private property (the incumbent's transmission facilities) cannot be violated without
disturbing patterns of use and established expectations. Finally, the arguments are disposed of
and then the issue becomes how to resolve the access question. The authors prefer a market-
price based system as opposed to mandatory/pro rata carriage orders.
The closer the system moves toward first come, first served as a basic principle,
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C. Federal Regulations and Allocative Efficiency
Federal natural gas and electricity initiatives clearly are motivated by
one overriding goal-to move energy regulations closer to the market. This
movement is premised on the reality that natural gas and electricity (and
oil and coal) are relatively abundant. Also, old electricity technologies seem
to have peaked, while new technologies in production and distribution
appear available. When combined, adequate supplies and potential techno-
logical gains mean greater efficiencies and more competition. In addition,
the prevailing tenet of American democratic capitalism asserts that markets
are better suited than governments to order supplies, demands, and prices
in a competitive environment. Therefore, as a matter of allocative efficiency,
FERC's regulatory gamble is to move price and allocation controls for
natural gas and electricity from the hearing rooms of FERC to the con-
strained markets proposed by these rulemakings.
FERC natural gas and electricity rulemakings are revolutionary in two
ways. First, the rulemakings rest on FERC's existing authority, not on some
new legislative mandate. Second, the rulemakings break away from tradi-
tional utility-type regulation. These proposals, still, are consistent with the
dominant model of energy regulation because the model aspires to mimic
the market and resorts to regulation only when a market imperfection
justifies government intervention. The one cautionary note is that the
regulatory transition may not be completely smooth. Although natural gas
pipelines and electricity distribution systems (public utilities) may complain
if they, in fact, lose market power, this complaint will fall on deaf ears. A
reduction in market power will improve allocative efficiency as goods move
to their highest valued uses without an accompanying loss of social welfare.
Yet, captive consumers of natural gas and electricity may bear an unrea-
sonable amount of the transition costs and a general move to the market
will not, on its own, protect those consumers. Instead, these consumers
look to state regulators for protection.
IV. STATE REGULATION AND ENERGY PLANNING
State public utility commissions (PUCs) have been buffeted by the
energy crisis as much as federal regulators. Instead of being pressured by
particularly as a result of pressure from new commodity providers and customers
seeking more competitively priced supplies, the greater the difficulty for the incum-
bent to use control of transmission facilities to frustrate commodity competition. In
addition, there will be a diminished ability to recover, through value-based pricing
of transmission, on the capital invested in the stranded generating assets.
[I]n the competition by new players for loads traditionally served by an incumbent,
the incumbent and the regulator should rely on flexible, aggressive pricing for the
load retention, rather than on arguments relating to the maintenance of rates of
return or the existing network of cross-subsidies.
Id. at 16-17; see also Pierce, supra note 123, at 1232-34 (discussing competitive transmission
rates).
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producers and other major industry actors, state utility commissions have
felt the pressure of consumers squeezed by price increases. State PUCs and
state legislatures responded to energy price increases by tightening the
conditions under which regulated utilities operate. 3 ' Rate hearings became
more contentious as PUCs more closely scrutinized the construction and
cancellation of nuclear plants, excess capacity, and the purchase of increas-
ingly expensive fuel. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s there was a feeling
that PUCs were in a reactive posture, waiting for the smoke from the
energy crisis to clear before engaging in wholesale regulatory reform. The
smoke has cleared substantially and PUCs are beginning to assess their
regulatory futures.
The clear signal from energy markets seems to be that we are not
running out of natural resources, that federal regulations have contributed
significantly to market distortions, that market-based utility regulation is
promising, and that federal regulators are committed to across the board
deregulation of natural gas and electricity. A simultaneous but contrary
signal from Washington is that the federal government is trying to centralize
energy decisionmaking. 13 9 These two signals share an allegiance to market
ordering and a belief in competitive pricing. These signals are largely silent
on the externalities associated with a transition to a greater reliance on the
market. In a real sense, current state regulations can be interpreted as not
addressing allocative efficiency, that is how to make the economic pie
bigger. Rather, the signals can be interpreted as addressing distributional
equity-how to protect persons not well situated to help themselves.
A. Natural Gas
Historically, state commissions regulated the natural gas industry. In
1938, the federal government intervened to regulate interstate transportation
with the passage of the Natural Gas Act. In producing states, 140 the regu-
lations were aimed at avoiding the Tragedy of the Commons 4' that results
from the rule of capture. 142 The rule of capture encourages owners of oil
and natural gas reserves to produce as much of those resources as they can
138. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing regulations and legislation that
public utility commissions and state legislatures enacted to shield consumers from paying for
capital investment that yielded no electricity).
139. In addition to FERC's attempted centralization, the U.S. Supreme Court is also
advancing the federalization of energy decisionmaking. See infra part IV.
140. The major natural gas producing areas are the Louisiana Gulf Coast, the Texas Gulf
Coast, the Anadarko/Amarillo fields in Texas, the East Texas field, the Appalachian region,
California, the Prudhoe Bay field in Alaska, and the San Juan Basin. M.E. SANDERS, supra
note 26, at 29; A. TUssING & C. BAnow, supra note 26, at 39.
141. See Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 ScmNcE 1243 (1968).
142. The Rule of Capture "holds that property in oil and gas is in the person who
produces them." H. WILLIAms, R. MAXWELL & C. MEYERS, CASES AND MATERLWS ON THE
LAW oF O.m AND GAS 13 n.l (4th ed. 1979); see also Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex.
575, 210 S.W.2d 558 (1948).
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before their neighbors. This incentive wastes the resource and results in the
Tragedy of the Commons. 141 One way around the downside of the rule of
capture is the doctrine of correlative rights. Under the doctrine of correlative
rights "each owner of oil and gas in a reservoir can produce its fair share
of the total oil and gas in the reservoir, measured with reference to its
proportionate ownership of the reservoir."' 44 Therefore, to avoid the waste
which the rule of capture creates and to protect correlative rights, states
regulate the amount of oil and natural gas that can be produced to avoid
waste and to promote efficient conservation. 145
In an important article, Professor Richard Pierce discusses the major
types of state producer regulations-unitization and direct regulation-and
analyzes and criticizes in detail four current examples of direct natural gas
regulations. 146 Pierce's analysis of "ratable take," "share-the-contract,"
"priority of purchase," and "allowable production" shows that these
regulations adversely affect free market exchanges in natural gas by favoring
producing states at the expense of consumers. Through direct regulation,
producing states have exercised market power for decades. Producing states
have driven oil and natural gas prices above marginal cost, thereby raising
prices and curtailing output at the expense of consumers and consuming
states.' 4 Pierce concludes that unitization is "vastly superior"' 4 to direct
regulation for both conservation and correlative rights purposes.
Ratable take regulations require a purchaser of natural gas to treat
equally all owners of a field. In Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v.
State Oil & Gas Board,49 the Mississippi Oil & Gas Board, the state's PUC,
applied the rule in a way that forced a pipeline to purchase gas from
producers with whom it had no contract. Although the United States
Supreme Court invalidated that application of the rule, the case shows what
odd consequences the ratable take rule can have. With enforceable rules,
the state, in effect, guarantees natural gas producers an out-of-state market
143. The wastes produced are: excess capital expended on drilling; too many wells dissipate
gas pressure and reduce total recovery; too little gas pressure increases lift costs; advantages
of natural storage are lessened or lost; and gas produced today at a low cost may loose the
opportunity costs of gas that could be produced tomorrow. See Friedman, The Economics of
the Common Pool: Property Rights in Exhaustible Resources, 18 UCLA L. Rsv 855 (1971);
Pierce, State Regulation of Natural Gas in a Federally Deregulated Market: The Tragedy of
the Commons Revisited, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 15, 21-23 (1987); Williams, Running Out: The
Problem of Exhaustible Resources, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1978).
144. Pierce, supra note 143, at 22-23.
145. See N. ELY, THE On, AND GAS CONSERVATION STATUTEs (ANNOTATED) (1933). The
statutes involved well spacing, number of wells, antiflaring legislation, and allowables. See
also Pierce, supra note 47, at 23-30.
146. Pierce, supra note 143; see also Natural Gas Regulation in the Western U.S.:
Perspectives on Regulation in the Next Decade, 27 NAT. REsourc s J. 771 (1987); Workshop
on Natural Gas Prorationing and Ratable Take Regulation, 57 U. CoLo. L. RPv. 149 (1986).
147. Pierce, supra note 143, at 28.
148. Id. at 27.
149. 474 U.S. 409 (1986). See infra notes 178-82 and accompanying text (discussing
Supreme Court's decision in Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp.).
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at above market prices. This guarantee increases production activities and
puts excess gas on the market.150 Pierce is highly critical of ratable take
rules because the rules "so completely undercut the NGPA's goal of
deregulating natural gas that no court could permit the orders to stand."''
Share-the-contract regulations'52 require the operator of a well to provide
a drilling unit owner with the option to have the operator market each
owner's share on terms at least as favorable as the operator's terms.1 53 In
effect, the regulations compel the operator to serve as the marketing agent
for the drilling unit. Unlike ratable take provisions, the share-the-contract
rule strives to equalize contract receipts among interest holders. The rule
trys to protect owners' correlative rights and does not increase the purchasing
obligation of pipelines.
Priority-of-purchase regulations' 54 require pipelines to purchase all gas
accessible to them in accordance with state-prescribed priorities. For ex-
ample, a PUC may require a pipeline to buy associated gas (gas produced
while oil is also being produced) from a nearby oil producer.' 55 This
regulation increases a pipeline's purchase obligation at prices above those
that would be set in an unregulated market. The increased purchase obli-
gation induces oversupply and increases the wealth of the producing states.
5 6
The final direct regulation that Pierce discusses is allowable production.
Allowable production sets the level of production "allowed" from any well
or lease form.' 57 Allowable regulations seek to achieve conservation. While
such regulations can encourage conservation, inevitably the regulations affect
correlative rights if different interest holders have different contracts with
a pipeline or no contracts at all with a pipeline. Also, allowable regulations
affect the supply of and demand for gas and, therefore, affect gas prices.'
58
These direct regulations, according to Pierce, contravene free market
principles and congressional initiatives by favoring producers and producing
states at the expense of consumers and consuming states. Direct regulations
frustrate the working of the market and, therefore, retard efficiency through
producer protection leading to higher than market prices. However, con-
suming states are not powerless against high prices and their most effective
weapon is ratemaking. Currently, PUCs use the ratemaking process to
counteract high gas costs and prevent extraordinary costs from being im-
posed on consumers.
150. Pierce, supra note 143, at 35-36.
151. Id. at 37.
152. See Seal v. The Corporation Comm'n of Oklahoma, 725 P.2d 278 (Okla. 1986)
(holding share-the-contract statute constitutional).
153. Pierce, supra note 143, at 38.
154. See ANR Pipeline Co. v. Corporation Con'n of Oklahoma, 643 F. Supp. 419
(W.D. Okla. 1986) (holding priority-of-purchase regulation unconstitutional).
155. Pierce, supra note 143, at 40.
156. Id. at 42.
157. Id. at 45.
158. Id. at 48.
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A recent opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility
Commission,"9 exemplifies the consuming states' response to distortions in
the natural gas market which have caused lower priced natural gas to be
available but not delivered to consumers. In 1984, Pennsylvania passed a
statute that required utilities of a certain size to pursue least cost gas
purchasing policies. 6° Equitable Gas Co. (Equitable) is a Pennsylvania
corporation involved in production, transportation, distribution, and sale
of natural gas. When Equitable filed for a rate increase in 1985, the
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission scrutinized its rate filing and de-
termined that in buying natural gas from its wholly owned subsidiary,
Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co., Equitable failed to purchase cheaper
available gas. The PUC denied the full rate increase ruling that the rate
would not be reasonable and prudent. On appeal, the Third Circuit upheld
the PUC order over several constitutional challenges, including federal pre-
emption. Equitable argued that the state court should declare the statute
invalid because the statute violated the filed rate doctrine' 61 and the NGPA's
free market preference. The court rejected these constitutional arguments,
reasoning:
Regarding the states' traditional power to consider the prudence of
a retailer's purchasing decision in setting retail rates, we find no
reason why utilities must be permitted to recover costs that are
imprudently incurred; those should be borne by the stockholders,
not the ratepayers. Although Nantahala underscores that a state
cannot independently pass upon the reasonableness of a wholesale
rate on file with FERC, it in no way undermines the long-standing
notion that a state commission may legitimately inquire into whether
the retailer prudently chose to pay the FERC-approved wholesale
rate of one source, as opposed to the lower rate of another source. 62
While the Kentucky West Virginia opinion is consistent with other state
PUC treatments regarding the purchase of overpriced natural gas, 63 the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Mississippi Power & Light Co. v.
Mississippi Public Service Commission,'" which regarded FERC's preemp-
159. 837 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1988).
160. 66 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN §§ 1307(f), 1317-18 (Purdon 1987).
161. See Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953 (1986) (enunciating
filled rate doctrine); infra notes 189-91 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's
decision in Nantahala Power & Light Co.).
162. Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 837 F.2d 600,
609 (3d Cir. 1988).
163. See, e.g., New Regulatory Framework for Gas Utilities, 79 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 1 (1986); Rate Design for Unbundled Gas Utility Service, 79 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR)
93 (1986).
164. 108 S. Ct. 2428 (1988).
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tion of prudency determinations, raises questions about the long-term staying
power of this strategy.
165
States have little power in the wholesale arena because of widespread
federal involvement. Yet, states can exercise retail ratemaking authority and,
as a result, indirectly regulate the activities of natural gas companies through
close monitoring of purchasing practices and close examination of a utility's
rate design, marketing, and financing in rate hearings.
B. Electricity
The most significant development in the state regulation of the electricity
industry is the response to increasing electricity costs, excess capacity, and
leveling growth in demand. These economic circumstances are a mixed
blessing. On the positive side, an active, competitive electricity market is
indicated by the fact that there is more elasticity in the electricity market
than once believed, that excess capacity exerts downward pressure on prices,
and that there are new producers of electricity trying to put their product
on the market. This is the good news, because with increased competition
efficiencies should be realized, that is, prices should fall and consumers
should benefit. These market circumstances, unfortunately, have a dark
side. Excess capacity indicates an overinvestment of capital and ratepayers
and shareholders, in some proportion, must pick up the costs of poor
investment.
The change in market conditions has resulted in two regulatory respon-
ses. As discussed earlier, the movement at the federal level is toward
deregulation. The response at the state level has been no less dramatic, but
in the opposite direction. The state regulatory call is for a new form of
utility regulation generically called least-cost utility planning (LCUP).
66
Simply defined, LCUP is intended to encourage electric utilities to provide
energy services at the least possible cost. 167 LCUP seeks to eliminate over-
expenditure of capital funds and is seen as an antidote to traditional cost-
based ratemaking that encouraged such overexpenditure.1
6
1
Briefly, LCUP requires either the utility or the state to undertake energy
studies which integrate supply and demand as well as cost and risk, to
165. Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 108 S. Ct. 2428
(1988); see also infra notes 192-98 and accompanying text.
166. See generally Berry, Least-cost Planning and Utility Regulation, PUB. U . FORT.,
Mar. 17, 1988, at 9; Burkhart, Least-cost Planning: A State Survey, PUB. Urn. FORT., May
14, 1987, at 38; Hayes & Scheer, Least-cost Planning: A National Perspective, PuB. Urn.
FORT., Mar. 19 1987, at 13; Ruff, Least-cost Planning and Demand-side Management: Six
Common Fallacies and One Simple Truth, Pun. UT. FORT., April 28, 1988, at 19; Steigelmann,
Demand-side Management and Least Cost in a Dynamic Setting, PUn. Urm. FORT., July 7,
1988, at 41; Wellinghof, The Forgotten Factor in Least-cost Utility Planning: Cost Recovery,
Pun. UTm. FORT., Mar. 31, 1988, at 9; Wellinghoff & Mitchell, A Model for Statewide
Integrated Utility Resource Planning, Pun. UTn FORT., Aug. 8, 1985, at 19.
167. Wellinghof, supra note 166, at 10.
168. See Averch & Johnson, supra note 119.
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attain a least-cost plan. These studies are used to decide such issues as
construction, generation, transmission, siting, fuel use, efficiency standards,
conservation, load management, and ratemaking. In the age of computers
it would seem that energy planning is doable. However, our recent economic
history, particularly as it pertains to energy, indicates that energy markets
are becoming more complicated and that utilities cannot continue to rely
on steady growth and a guaranteed service area. Indeed, energy planners
cite several causes of increased planning complexity that make LCUP a
difficult business: increased economic and market uncertainty; 69 more energy
supply options; 70 multiple and frequently conflicting economic and social
policy objectives;17' and increasingly complicated load forecasting 72
C. Distributional Equity and State Regulations
State natural gas and electricity regulations are decidedly more concerned
with distributional (or political) goals than with efficiency. The natural gas
regulations explicitly protect natural gas producers and the electricity regu-
lations intentionally protect consumers. In both cases, the imposition of
energy regulations may well raise the cost of doing business and, therefore,
may not be efficient.173 The gas rules increase the market price of gas and
the electricity rules increase the transaction costs in the electricity business.
Nevertheless, the regulations fit the policy model because they attempt to
accommodate viable political voices in a dynamic federal system.
V. TnE SUPREME COURT AND ENERGY FEDERALISM
Federal and state regulations regard the means and ends of energy policy
differently. Federal regulations favor deregulation centralized in Washing-
ton, D.C. to achieve market-ordering and allocative efficiency, while state
regulations favor planning decentralized in the several states to achieve
consumer protection and distributional equity. The conflict between the
federal and state governments over the means and ends of energy policy
can be seen as a classic example of a federalism power struggle. And so it
169. Uncertainty is caused by increased volatility of fuel prices, construction costs, lead
times, interfuel competition, competition among suppliers, and regulatory uncertainty. See
Hayes and Scheer, supra note 166, at 16.
170. New energy suppliers increase the competitiveness of the market and come in the
form of conventional and new generating technologies, load-management and demand-side
alternatives, greater purchasing opportunities, cogeneration, small power production, diversi-
fication, growing flexibility in pricing, and growing opportunities for risk sharing. Id.
171. In the more competitive environment, corporate objectives are increasing. A utility,
for example, can diversify by investing in other energy projects, or in nonenergy markets, or
it can decide to minimize capital expenditures or invest in conservation and many of these
decisions will depend on the regulatory climate.
172. See, e.g., Bjorklund, Planning for Uncertainty at an Electric Utility, PUn. UTr.
FoRT., Oct. 15, 1987, at 15.
173. I use the term "efficiency" loosely here to mean an aggregate increase in wealth. I
also simply take for granted that a reduction in transaction costs is an efficient move.
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is. These federal-state differences can also be seen as complementary in that
they are held together in rough tension by the dynamic model of energy
policy described in part II. Intergovernmental conflict (federalism), no less
than intragovernmental conflict (separation of powers), 74 is a conscious part
of a modulating energy policymaking and decisionmaking system. Moreover,
the system has a built-in dispute resolution mechanism. The United States
Supreme Court is frequently the final arbiter of federalism conflicts.
In recent years, through a series of natural gas and electricity decisions,
the Court has provoked discussion of an intriguing question about the
direction of national energy policy: Does federal deregulation of energy
markets preempt states from regulating those markets? This question is both
intellectually and politically challenging.
Intellectually, particularly from an historical standpoint, there seems to
be no great impediment to Congress' preempting state regulation in favor
of a free market. After all, the main purpose of the Commerce Clause is
to promote national markets and avoid the state balkanization of trade.
Yet logically, it seems odd to say that Congress can "legislate" a free
market by its inaction. Certainly, a market established by congressional
declaration is not free.
Politically, though, things are a little simpler. First, the federal govern-
ment resists all-encompassing solutions to complex energy issues. Histori-
cally, the country has never had and is unlikley to have a comprehensive
national energy plan. The lack of a comprehensive national energy plan
obviates the need for grand pronouncements about Congress mandating a
"free market" in energy. Second, as a matter of political logic, because
states are sovereigns, Congress does not have the power to tell states to
stop legislating or to stop regulating energy markets when it refuses to
regulate.175 States will continue to act and, occasionally, those state actions
will be challenged in court and, again occasionally, those challenges will
end up in the United States Supreme Court.
The question posed earlier about the scope of congressional power and
authority to "legislate" a free market in energy remains provocative in light
of recent federal deregulatory efforts. The question also permeates the
Court's recent preemption rulings affecting both the natural gas and elec-
tricity industries. These decisions indicate a shift in favor of the centrali-
174. Fundamental examples of intragovernmental conflict include: judiciary v. agency;
judiciary v. legislature; executive v. legislature; and any other combination. For a discussion
of such conflicts in an energy context, see Aman, supra note 6; Byse, supra note 6; Tomain,
supra note 6.
Perhaps the best exposition of the dynamic role of conflict in our polity is James Madison's
discussion of separation of powers. Madison writes that by separating and allocating power
among various branches, ambition can be used to counteract ambition, thus enabling the
government to function. See THE FEDERALST No. 51 (J. Madison).
175. See Pierce, supra note 143, at 15. Pierce disagrees with this. He writes: "When
Congress determines that a market should operate free from the distortive effects of federal
price regulation, that statutory determination should also foreclose the potentially distortive
effects of many forms of state regulation." Id.
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zation of energy decisionmaking in the federal government and greater
reliance on the market and market-based controls, while reducing the ambit
of regulatory authority left in the states.
A. The Court's Natural Gas Docket
On the natural gas side of its docket, the Court recently ruled in
Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co. 7 6 that the existing scheme of federal
regulation under the Natural Gas Act preempted a Michigan statute requiring
natural gas pipelines to obtain state approval before issuing securities. The
Court reasoned that the Michigan statute regulated the rates and facilities
of natural gas companies transporting natural gas in interstate commerce
and thus constituted an interference with a field occupied by the NGA. The
state argued that the statute was aimed at preventing an overcapitalization
of gas transporters to protect ratepayers and investors, and to assure supply.
The state claimed that this protection was a traditional state public utility
commission function. The Court rejected the state's protectionist arguments
in holding that the statute was preempted.
Schneidewind is consistent with two other recent Court opinions up-
holding FERC deregulation of the natural gas market. This Term, in Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission v. Martin Exploration & Management Co.,'"
the Court was asked to interpret the NGPA's price setting provisions. The
NGPA categorized "new tight formation gas," a certain category of natural
gas, as either regulated or deregulated. Oddly, because of market conditions,
the regulated category was priced higher than the deregulated category and
producers sought to take advantage of the higher regulated rate. FERC
ruled that the deregulated rate applied, but the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the ruling.' 7' The Supreme Court
reversed the Tenth Circuit and adopted the FERC interpretation in a pro-
deregulation opinion. After discussing the legislative history of natural gas
regulation, the Supreme Court said: "Not one participant in the legislative
process suggested that producers should receive higher prices than deregu-
lation would afford them. The operating assumption of Congress was that
deregulation was the most favorable regime for gas producers under con-
sideration."'79
A third recent natural gas opinion is Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line
Corp. v. Mississippi State Oil & Gas Board'" (Transco). In Transco, the
Supreme Court held that federal regulation preempted Mississippi's "ratable
take" rule. Ratable take rules are intended to protect the correlative rights
176. 108 S. Ct. 1145 (1988).
177. 108 S. Ct. 1765 (1988).
178. Martin Exploration & Mgmt. Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 813 F.2d
1059 (10th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 1765 (1988).
179. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Martin Exploration & Mgrnt. Co., 108 S. Ct.
1765, 1769 (1988).
180. 474 U.S. 409 (1986).
ENERGY AD VICE
of the interest holders of a common pool. Previously, the rule was used to
prevent one purchaser from buying from one buyer who might then drain
a common pool.' 8' Before this litigation, the ratable take rule had never
been used to require a pipeline to buy from noncontract sellers.
In 1978, Transco, an interstate pipeline company, entered into thirty-
five contracts with gas producers holding interests in a common field. Those
contracts contained take-or-pay clauses favorable to the producers. 82 Be-
cause of a gas shortage, Transco purchased all the contract gas the contracts
required and also purchased gas from producers who held interests in the
common field but with whom Transco had no contracts. When demand
declined in 1982, the thirty-five contracts obligated Transco to take-or-pay
for the gas. However, Transco had no similar obligation to take-or-pay for
noncontract gas. The Mississippi Oil and Gas Board, under the authority
of the state's ratable take rule, ordered Transco to buy proportionate
amounts of gas from noncontract producers. In addition, the Board said
that Transco must purchase the noncontract gas according to nondiscrimi-
natory take-or-pay provisions. In other words, the Mississippi Oil and Gas
Board used the ratable take rule to force Transco to buy gas that it did
not need from producers with whom it had no contract. The obvious effect
of such a ruling was to protect in-state producers and raise prices to mostly
out-of-state consumers.
Although the Mississippi Supreme Court found no federal preemption
because the NGPA completely deregulated the type of gas in question, the
United States Supreme Court stood that reasoning on its head. The Court
ruled that high priced gas deregulation under NGPA had little to do with
state regulation affecting a pipeline's costs and purchasing patterns. The
Court ruled: "Mississippi's action directly undermines Congress' determi-
nation that the supply, the demand, and the price of high-cost gas be
determined by market forces."'8 3
In preempting the Mississippi Oil and Gas Board's order, the Court
directly confronted the earlier posed question concerning the preemptive
effects of deregulation. The Court analyzed the preemption issue by ascer-
taining whether Congress, in revising natural gas regulations to give market
forces a more significant role in determining supply, demand, and price,
intended to give the states the power it denied FERC. The Court concluded
that: "In light of Congress' intent to move toward a less-regulated national
natural gas market, its decision to remove jurisdiciton from FERC cannot
be interpreted as an invitation to the States to impose additional regula-
181. A "ratable take" provision requires gas purchasers to buy gas according to the
proportion of ownership of a natural gas pool even though the purchaser has a contract or
contracts with less than all the members of the pool. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying
text (discussing ratable take regulations).
182. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
183. Transcontinental Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil and Gas Bd. of Mississippi, 474 U.S.
409, 422 (1986).
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tions."' Concerned that the ratable take rule disturbed NGPA's attempted
unification of the natural gas markets, the Court invalidated the state order,
saying that the invalidation would inure to the benefit of consumers.
Thus, in Schneidewind and Transco the Court preempted state regula-
tions, while in Martin Exploration it upheld FERC. In these three cases,
the Court sent two loud signals. First, the federal government was to control
energy regulation. Second, market-oriented deregulation efforts could be
used to preempt state regulations that interferred with the free functioning
of energy markets. Consistent with these natural gas decisions, the Court's
recent electricity opinions further the growing federal centralization of energy
regulation.
B. The Court's Electricity Docket
In Arkansas Electric Co-operative v. Arkansas Public Service Commis-
sion, ' 5 the Court suggested, in dicta, that deregulation of energy markets
could constitute preemption of state regulation. Arkansas Electric concerned
the state's assertion of jurisdiction over the wholesale rates that the Arkansas
Electric Co-operative, a rural electric co-operative, charged its customers,
who were seventeen smaller rural co-ops. Normally, the federal government
established wholesale rates. Although Arkansas Electric was plugged into
an interstate grid, a normally sufficient condition for the assertion of federal
wholesale jurisdiction, FERC ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the
wholesale rates of rural co-operatives, thus leaving a regulatory gap.
This gap provoked Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, to ruminate
that congressional deregulation may lead to preemption: "[A] federal de-
cision to forego regulation in a given area may imply an authoritative
federal determination that the area is best left unregulated, and in that
event would have as much preemptive force as a decision to regulate."'8 6
Brennan held otherwise: "In this case, however, nothing in the language,
history, or policy of the Federal Power Act suggests such a conclusion.' 87
Consequently, states were allowed to regulate the wholesale rates of electric
co-operatives because neither the Federal Power Act nor the Rural Electri-
fication Act 8 indicated that Congress intended to preclude the states from
so regulating.
Although Arkansas Electric upheld state jurisdiction, the Court's dis-
cussion of deregulation and pre-emption were ominous signs for state energy
regulators. Since Arkansas Electric the Supreme Court has issued two
important opinions that severely constrict the scope of state jurisdiction in
electric utility rate regulation. These decisions indicate a recentralization of
electricity decisionmaking in FERC.
184. id. at 423.
185. 461 U.S. 375 (1983).
186. Arkansas Elec. Co-op. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 384 (1983).
187. Id. The Court also held that nothing in the Rural Electrification Act preempted state
authority. Id. at 385.
188. 7 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq. (1982).
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In Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg,189 the Supreme Court
overturned the North Carolina PUC's allocation of electric power as pre-
empted by the FPA. In Nantahala, Nantahala Power & Light (Nantahala)
and Tapoco, Inc, were wholly owned subsidiaries of the Aluminum Com-
pany of America (Alcoa), and each owned hydroelectric power plants on
the Little Tennessee River. Nantahala served customers at wholesale rates
regulated by FERC and at retail rates regulated by the North Carolina
Utilities Commission (NCUC). Tapoco's sole function was to manage the
power that went to Alcoa. Nantahala and Tapoco sold most of the electricity
generated by these plants to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a federal
marketing authority. The TVA, in turn, supplied Nantahala and Tapoco
with a fixed amount of low-cost "entitlement" power pursuant to contracts
filed with FERC.
Nantahala applied to the NCUC for a rate increase for its intrastate
retail rates. The NCUC issued an order that apportioned the TVA entitle-
ment power to Nantahala and Tapoco differently than the contract filed
with FERC. The NCUC allocated North Carolina retail customers a greater
share of the entitlement power. Consequently, this allocation lowered the
price of power for North Carolina retail customers and raised the price of
power for Tapoco's sales to Alcoa. The North Carolina Supreme Court
held that such a reallocation was not preempted because retail rate regulation
was a traditional prerogative of state PUCs.190 On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court held that "[o]nce FERC sets such a rate, a State may not
conclude in setting retail rates that the FERC-approved wholesale rates are
unreasonable. A state must rather give effect to Congress's desire to give
FERC plenary authority over interstate wholesale rates, and to ensure that
the States do not interfere with this authority." 191
The Nantahala decision strengthened the filed rate doctrine, that is the
doctrine which holds that a FERC filed and accepted contract governs the
relationship between the parties to the contract. With the Nantahala decision,
the Court set up this past Term's most significant energy law case, which
may well lead to a significant restructuring of the electric industry. Missis-
sippi Power & Light v. Mississippi Public Service Commission 92 went to
189. 476 U.S. 953 (1986).
190. The North Carolina court was not far off in its analysis. As recently as 1983, the
United States Supreme Court issued a similar ruling. In Pacific Gas & Electric Co v. State
Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission, 461 U.S. 190 (1983), the consti-
tutionality of a California statute which required a nuclear power plant operator to obtain a
state license before operation was at issue. In the face of a preemption challenge, the Court
upheld the state statute. Justice White wrote:
[S]tates retain their traditional responsibility in the field of regulating electrical
utilities for determining questions of need, reliability, cost, and other related state
concerns.
Need for new power facilities, their economic feasibility, and rates and service,
are areas that have been characteristically governed by the States.
Id. at 205.
191. Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966 (1986).
192. 108 S. Ct. 2428 (1988).
1989]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:63
the heart of perhaps the most vexing problem facing public utilities-how
to allocate the billions of dollars of costs associated with cancelled nuclear
plants. The fact that electric utilities must satisfy two regulatory authorities
that may have different views about what constitutes a prudent investment
further complicates the problem. More to the point, state regulators are
more likely to protect their own ratepayers than are federal regulators and
FERC has been more generous to the electric industry than many states. 93
In Mississippi Power & Light, the Court held that once FERC allocates
power among members of an interstate system, the state PUC cannot
conduct a prudency review regarding the purchase of that power by indi-
vidual members. With reference to the filed rate doctrine, the Court relied
on Nantahala in holding that the FERC allocation preempts these state
prudency reviews.
Middle South Utilities (MSU) is a holding company that wholly owns
the stock of four operating companies, including Mississippi Power & Light
Company (MP&L). The four operating companies engage in selling whole-
sale power among themselves and to other companies outside the system.
The operating companies sell retail power in their separate states. MP&L
sells retail power in Mississippi. A contract filed with FERC guided wholesale
transactions among the four companies. Pursuant to that contract, MP&L
was assigned the responsibility of constructing two nuclear power facilities
known as Grand Gulf 1 and Grand Gulf 2. Because the nuclear project
was too large for one utility to finance, MSU formed a new subsidiary
called Middle South Energy, Inc. (MSE), which acquired full title to Grand
Gulf.
By the late 1970s, it became apparent that Grand Gulf's capacity was
unnecessary and that the project had cost overruns six times greater than
anticipated. The decision was made to finish Grand Gulf 1 and to halt
construction on and cancel Grand Gulf 2. In 1982, MSU filed a contract
with FERC which set wholesale rates for MSE's sale of Grand Gulf 1 power
and assigned proportionate shares to the four operating companies, including
MP&L. After reviewing the filed contract, FERC reallocated power among
the operating units in order to equalize costs in a just, reasonable, and non-
discriminatory manner. 194
FERC did not explicitly address the prudency of completing Grand Gulf
1. Instead, FERC accepted the testimony of MSU officials that Grand Gulf
1 would meet system needs. The United States Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit affirmed FERC's order that the operating companies share the
cost of Grand Gulf in proportion to their relative demand for energy
generated by the system as a whole. 95
Meanwhile, before the Mississippi Public Service Commission (MPSC),
MP&L filed for a rate increase to cover the costs of its share of Grand
193. See J. TomAsN, NucIEAa PoWER TRANSFORMATION ch. 5 (1987).
194. MP&L's share after the FERC reallocation was the same share as per the contract.
195. Mississippi Industries v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 808 F.2d 1525 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 500 (1987).
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Gulf. MPSC initially denied MP&L any rate relief for Grand Gulf 1 and
then awarded emergency rate relief to keep MP&L solvent. On appeal, the
Mississippi Supreme Court ruled that MPSC overstepped its authority to
award rate relief until a prudency determination had been made. The court
specifically rejected MP&L's argument that Nantahala precluded the MPSC
from ignoring FERC's allocation of wholesale rates, reasoning that Nan-
tahala was silent regarding prudency, and that such a review was within the
province of the state commission. In further support of its reasoning, the
court noted that FERC made no prudency determination, and therefore,
the matter was left open for state determination in setting retail rates. The
court then remanded the case to MPSC for a prudency review.
In the United States Supreme Court, MP&L argued that FERC's
allocation preempted the state determination and the Court agreed. The
Court stated that
our decision in Nantahala rests on a foundation that is broad
enough to support the order entered by FERC in this case and to
require the MPSC to treat MP&L's FERC-mandated payments for
Grand Gulf costs as reasonable incurred operating expenses for the
purpose of setting MP&L's retail rates.
196
Put even more starkly, the MPSC was precluded from determining the
prudency of the Grand Gulf 1 project even though the issue was never
explicitly addressed either before FERC or in the D.C. Circuit.
In issuing its ruling, the Court articulated three principles. First, FERC
has exclusive authority to determine the reasonableness of wholesale rates.
Second, FERC's exclusive authority also extends to power allocations that
affect wholesale rates. Third, states may not bar regulated utilities from
passing through to retail customers FERC-mandated wholesale rates.197 With
these rules, the Court tries to establish a bright line between federal and
state authority. The Court's bright line is that states may not regulate in
areas where FERC has exercised its jurisdiction to determine just and
reasonable wholesale rates or to insure that agreements affecting wholesale
rates are reasonable.
98
The Court also wanted to prevent state commissions from "trapping"
federally approved rates. If, for example, FERC approved a $500 million
capital investment in a nuclear plant, and the state PUC approved only
$400 million of that, then $100 million would be "trapped" by the PUC
determination. The so-called trapped amount could not flow through to
ratepayers. The real significance of the discussion of trapping is cost
allocation. Under Mississippi Power & Light, which precludes trapping, all
FERC approved costs pass through to ratepayers. Under the MPSC allo-
196. Mississippi Power & Light v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 108 S. Ct. 2428, 2438
(1988).
197. Id. at 2439.
198. Id. at 2440.
19891
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:63
cation, all of the costs that are not passed through to ratepayers must be
absorbed by shareholders.
By extending Nantahala in Mississippi Power & Light, the Court ex-
tended the doctrine that states cannot question wholesale rates set by FERC
(the Narragansett doctrine)' 99 and effectively swallowed the exception that
states may question the prudency of purchasing a certain quantity of FERC
approved wholesale power. According to one commentator, Mississippi
Power & Light will likely have the following effects:
(1) To encourage electric utilities to operate through integrated
systems in which generating capacity is owned and operated by
subsidiaries and in which wholesale power is sold to separate
operating units which engage only in retail distribution, thus
establishing a "safe harbor" from state regulation;
(2) to increase the participation of state commissions and consumer
interest groups before FERC; and
(3) to restrict the ability of state commissions to disallow expendi-




The three electricity cases, no less so than the natural gas decisions,
demonstrate that energy policymaking is being centralized in the federal
government. More significantly, the cases suggest that federal deregulation
may preclude state energy regulation. Even though Arkansas Electric upheld
the state exercise of jurisdiction over wholesale rates, Justice Brennan's
dicta inaugurated a discourse about the extent to which deregulation impli-
cates preemption. The tilt toward preemption increased in Nantahala and
Transco and even more so in Mississippi Power & Light.
Read together, this group of six cases set up the question posed earlier:
Does federal deregulation of energy markets preempt states from regulating
those markets? In the 1987 Term, the Supreme Court again addressed the
question and answered in the negative.
C. "Legislating" a Free Market in Energy
The case that raised these intriguing issues in the 1987 Term was Puerto
Rico Department of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp.20 ' In Isla
Petroleum the oil company petitioners argued that federal deregulation of
the oil industry stood for free market controls and inferred preemption of
state regulation. In 1973, in response to disruptions in world oil markets,
Congress passed the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act (EPAA),20 2 which
199. Narragansett Electric Co. v. Burke, 381 A.2d 1358 (R.I. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 972 (1978).
200. Norris, The Shrinking of State Rate-making Power - Lessons from Grand Gulf,
PuB. Ur . FORT., Aug. 4, 1988, at 45.
201. 108 S. Ct. 1350 (1988).
202. 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-760(h) (1982).
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empowered the president to promulgate oil pricing and allocation controls,
which he did.
203
Prior to the enactment of the EPAA, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico regulated gasoline and petroleum product prices. These regulations
were suspended during the period of federal regulation. In 1975, Puerto
Rican regulatory authority was restored. In 1986, nearly five years after
federal price controls expired, the Puerto Rico Department of Consumer
Affairs passed a series of oil regulations. These regulations included an
excise tax on oil refiners and a maximum profit margin on sales by
wholesalers to retailers.
Several oil companies contested the constitutionality of the oil regula-
tions, arguing that federal deregulation meant that oil was to be traded on
the market free from state interference. The Supreme Court did not agree
with the oil companies' argument. After discussing other important energy
law cases, 204 Justice Scalia wrote:
[The oil companies] have brought to our attention statements that
may reflect general congressional approval of a free market in
petroleum products, or general congressional belief that such a
market would result from enactment of the EPCA, or even general
congressional desire that it result. But unacted approvals, beliefs,
and desires are not laws. Without a text that can, in light of those
statements, plausibly be interpreted as prescribing federal pre-emp-
tion it is impossible to find that a free market was mandated by
federal law.205
It is indeed a strange world when a unanmious2 Rehnquist Court in
an opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia rejects the free market and
allows state regulation in a federally deregulated market. 2°7 That, however,
was exactly the effect of the Court's holding. The holding does not say
that the federal government cannot legislate in favor of a free market.
Rather, the Isla Petroleum decision simply says that unless the federal
government clearly indicates its intent to rely on a free market, states can
regulate. The current state of the law is that deregulation alone does not
203. The EPAA was extended in the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Pub.
L. No.94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975) (codified in various sections of U.S.C.).
204. See Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil & Gas Bd., 474 U.S. 409
(1986) (deregulation and preemption of the natural gas market) (discussed supra notes 179-83
and accompanying text); Arkansas Elec. Co-op. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
379 (1983) (deregulation and preemption of electricity) (discussed infra notes 185-88 and
accompanying text).
205. Puerto Rico Dept. of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp, 108 S. Ct. 1350
(1988).
206. Justice O'Connor took no part in the opinion.
207. It is no less strange to have Justice Brennan write that congressional inaction may
serve to preempt state legislation in favor of a free market. See Arkansas Elec. Co-op. v.
Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375 (1983) (discussed supra notes 185-88 and
accompanying text).
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create a free market. The more extreme case regarding the constitutionality
of a congressional declaration that neither the federal nor state governments
will regulate energy markets is yet to be brought before the Court.
D. The Supreme Court and Energy Policy
Besides noting a trend of centralization and preemption, the Court
apparently has reached an "efficient" solution in most of the cases exam-
ined. 20 8 In each of the natural gas cases, pipelines were big winners because
the Court's rulings have the effect of reducing the costs of doing business
for pipelines. Schneidewind lowered the pipelines' cost of issuing securities;
Martin Exploration lowered the purchase cost of "new tight formation gas"
to the market price; and Transco lowered the cost of purchasing gas by not
forcing pipelines to buy from persons with whom they had no contract.
The efficiency effects of the electricity cases are less clear. The electricity
cases concern the allocation of authority to decide how costs will be spread.
In Arkansas Electric, the state was permitted to regulate wholesale rates in
the absence of federal regulation and in the face of congressional silence.
In Nantahala and Mississippi Power & Light, FERC won the authority to
administer filed contracts while preempting state regulators. The practical
effect of this allocation of decisionmaking power is to streamline energy
decisionmaking, with the likely consequence that federal regulators more
often will protect shareholders over ratepayers. 209 Thus, in this series of
opinions the Court allocates decisionmaking power between two competing
claimants-the federal and state governments.
These Supreme Court cases underscore the role of federalism as energy
decisionmaking and policymaking power is allocated between the federal
and state governments. Furthermore, this allocation is consistent with the
model of energy policy under review. Not only does the model foster intra-
and interindustry competition in the private sector; the model also fosters
an active energy federalism.
If anything is certain throughout the history of energy regulation, it is
that energy regulation is a joint federal-state enterprise. Federalism in energy
regulation is necessary because of two realities. The first is the geophysical
reality that a large portion of natural resources are privately owned and
fall under state jurisdiction. Also, because the federal government owns
208. See supra note 172. If the preemption of a state regulation reduces the cost of doing
business, then, under this simple definition, the decision can be called efficient. A more
complete efficiency analysis, however, would compare the costs and benefits of two regulatory
regimes. For example, in Schneidewind the Court invalidated a state securities regulation and
in the text I wrote that this is an efficient decision. On a closer inspection, however, it may
well be that the securities regulation may have generated a large set of benefits in consumer
satisfaction greater than the costs to the pipeline of complying with the regulation together
with the costs of administering the regulation. Unfortunately, that data is impossible to obtain
and the more sophisticated efficiency analysis cannot be performed.
209. See D. ANDERSON, supra note 93; P. NAVARRO, supra note 93; J. TomAuN, supra
note 193.
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one-third of the country's land and has jurisdiction over the outer conti-
nental shelf, natural resources used in energy production necessarily confront
dual jurisdictions. The second reality necessitating federalism in energy
regulation is the economic reality of national and international energy
markets. These markets require coordination of supply and demand (and
pricing) to maximize the efficiency of energy production, distribution, and
consumption while keeping the United States an active player in global
markets. Consequently, energy policy is developed in an active federal
system, and the current shift toward centralized administration is most likely
only temporary, as accommodations and compromises are made, and as
conflicts and disagreements are resolved between and among the federal
and state governments.
VI. CONCLUSION
If the model described above holds true, and history tells us that it
should, then the Bush Administration may want to adopt one or more of
the following energy policies that fall within the boundaries imposed by the
dominant model:
(1) increase efficiencies in electricity production through encourage-
ment of mergers, consolidations, power pooling, and central
dispatching;
(2) favor a slight federal centralization in electricity regulation as a
result of Mississippi Power & Light with a concomitant reduction
of state regulatory power;
(3) experiment with deregulation of bulk power sales of electricity;
(4) increase investment in new electricity generating technologies
either by traditional utilities or by new entrants such as QFs,
IPPs, and self-generators;
(5) increase federal regulation of open access of natural gas and
electricity transmission systems;
(6) encourage slight price rises in oil and natural gas;
(7) maintain environmental regulations on fossil fuels;
(8) encourage state regulatory protection for captive gas and elec-
tricity consumers to assure reliability and fair rates;
(9) engage in rate experimentation and differential rate treatment
such as market-based or avoided-cost rates for competitive/
interruptible customers and cost-of-service rates for firm/captive
customers;
(10) reduce service obligations and encourage more open franchise
areas for public utilities in exchange for greater diversification
and a more liberal use of the prudent investment standard in
ratemaking;
(11) continue the hiatus on nuclear power development in light of
the demand for tightened safety standards and concerns over
long-term waste disposal; and
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(12) increase federal investment in alternative resources, technolo-
gies, and conservation.
Generating a laundry list of energy policies is relatively easy because
the basic energy model has lasted for nearly a century. Just as the federal
government is loosening its utility-type regulations and is depending more
on the market, state governments are tightening traditional utility-type
regulation and are more closely scrutinizing the utilities under their charge.
When federal and state regulations conflict to the point that one set of
objectives cannot be accomplished because of the existence of another set
of regulations, then the judiciary serves as a backstop to prevent the energy
policymaking system from completely unraveling.
Federal and state regulations, and the tension between them, are con-
sistent with the dominant model of energy policy which takes its cues from
a market shaped by government-industry interactions. Government-industry
interactions are based on a fundamental tradeoff. Government regulation
aids industry in mimicking the market and achieving greater energy (and
economic) efficiencies while simultaneously guarding against market power.
Thus, the dynamic model of energy policymaking capitalizes on continuous
inter- and intragovernmental political conflicts as much as it does on inter-
and intra-industry economic competition in our mixed-market political econ-
omy.
